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INTRODUCTION
STS-81 was the fifth of nine planned missions to dock with the Russian Mir
Space Station and the fourth crewmember transfer mission. Astronaut John
Blaha, who was on the Mir since September 19, 1996, was replaced by
Astronaut Jerry Linenger. The double Spacehab module was carried for the
second time, and it housed experiments that were performed by the crew and
logistics equipment (in excess of 6,000 Ib) that was transferred to the Mir. After
transfer of equipment to the Mir, space was provided for return items from the
Mir.
The STS-81 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report summarizes the activities
such as rendezvous and docking and experiment operations. This report also
discusses the Orbiter, External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster (SRB),
Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), and the Space Shuttle main engine
(SSME) performance during this eighty-first mission of the Space Shuttle
Program. STS-81 was the fifty-sixth flight since the return to flight and the
eighteenth flight of the Atlantis (OV-104). In addition to the Orbiter, the flight
vehicle consisted of an ET that was designated ET-83; three Phase II SSMEs
that were designated as serial numbers 2041, 2034, and 2042 in positions 1,2,
and 3, respectively; and two SRBs that were designated BI-082. The two
RSRMs were designated RSRM-54 with one installed in each SRB. The
individual RSRMs were designated as 360T054A for the left SRB, and
360T054B for the right SRB.
The STS-81 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report fulfills the Space Shuttle
Program requirement as documented in NSTS 07700, Volume VII, Appendix E.
The requirement is that each organizational element supporting the Program will
report the results of their hardware and software evaluation and mission
performance plus identify all related in-flight anomalies.
The primary objectives of this flight were to perform the fifth rendezvous and
docking with the Russian Mir Space Station and perform a logistics resupply and
the exchange of a Mir Astronaut. A double Spacehab module carried science
experiments and hardware (including the Biorack facility consisting of two
incubators, a glovebox, and two refrigerators as well as a refrigerator/freezer),
the Space Acceleration Measurements System (SAMS), Risk Mitigation
Experiments (RMEs) and Russian logistics in support of the Phase 1 Program
requirements.
The secondary objectives of this flight included the performance of the KidSat
Payload activities, and the Cosmic Radiation Effects and Activation Monitor
(CREAM) activities; and, as a payload of opportunity when the objectives could
be met without impacting the flight, the performance of the Midcourse Space
Experiment (MSX).
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The STS-81 flight was planned as a 10-day plus 2-contingency-day flight. The
two contingency days were available for bad weather avoidance for landing or
other Orbiter contingency operations. The sequence of events for the
STS-81 mission are shown in Table I, and the Orbiter In-Flight Anomaly List is
shown in Table I1. The Government Fumished equipment/flight crew equipment
(GFE/FCE) Problem Tracking List is shown in Table II1.
Appendix A lists the sources of data, both formal and informal, that were used in
the preparation of this report. Appendix B provides the definition of acronyms
and abbreviations used throughout the report. All times during the flight are
given in Greenwich mean time (G.m.t.) and mission elapsed time (MET).
The seven-person crew for STS-81 consisted of eight persons because of the
crewmember exchange that occurred. The crewmembers were Michael A.
Baker, Capt., U.S. Navy, Commander; Brent Jett, CDR, U.S. Navy, Pilot; Peter J.
K. Wisoff, Civilian, Ph.D., Mission Specialist 1; John M. Grunsfeld, Civilian,
Ph.D., Mission Specialist 2; Marsha S. Ivins, Civilian, Mission Specialist 3; and
Jerry Linenger, Capt. Medical Corps, U.S. Navy, Mission Specialist 4 (Ascent)
and John E. Blaha, Col. USAF Retired, Mission Specialist 4 (Descent). STS-81
was the sixth flight for Mission Specialist 4 (Descent), the fourth flight for the
Commander and Mission Specialist 3, the third flight for the Mission Specialist 1,
and the second flight for the Pilot, Mission Specialist 2, and Mission Specialist 4
(Ascent).
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MISSION SUMMARY
Liftoff of the STS-81 flight occurred on-time at 12:09:27:22.984 G.m.t.
(4:27:23 a.m.e.s.t, on January 12, 1997)following a countdown with no
unscheduled holds. The ascent trajectory was nominal, and no orbital
maneuvering subsystem (OMS) 1 maneuver was required. An evaluation of
vehicle performance during ascent was made using vehicle acceleration and
preflight propulsion prediction data. From these data, the average flight-derived
engine specific impulse (Isp) determined for the time period between SRB
separation and start of 3-g throttling was 453.59 seconds as compared to the
Main Propulsion System(MPS) tag value of 453.18 seconds.
All SSME and RSRM start sequences occurred as expected and the launch
phase propulsion performance was satisfactory in all respects. First stage
ascent performance was nominal as was SRB separation, entry, deceleration,
and water impact. The SRBs were recovered and returned to Kennedy Space
Center (KSC) for disassembly and refurbishment. Performance of the SSMEs,
ET and MPS was nominal.
The OMS 2 maneuver was initiated at 12:10:10:23.8 G.m.t.
[00:00:43:00.9 mission elapsed time (MET)]. The maneuver was 47 seconds in
duration and a differential velocity (AV) of 75.5 ft/sec was imparted to the vehicle.
The payload bay doors were fully open at 12:11:06:53 G.m.t. (00:01:39:26 MET).
The door opening was nominal and performed in dual-motor time.
The crew reported that the aft-port latch on the lithium hydroxide (LiOH) stowage
door was difficult to open (Flight Problem STS-81-V-01). They were unable to
open the latch by hand and a tool was used. The plan was to leave this latch
open until entry day. A loads analysis was performed and it showed that the
LiOH door with the recumbent seat installed could withstand a 20g crash load
with the aft-port latch open.
Fifteen contingency water containers (CWCs) were evacuated in preparation for
transfer of water to the Mir. The procedure was begun at 013:02:03 G.m.t.
(00:16:35 MET) and completed at 013:03:27 G.m.t. (00:17:59 MET). This
procedure was utilized on STS-81 as a result of reports that gas was in the
CWCs filled during STS-79.
The rendezvous with the Mir was performed nominally. The Mir approach timing
and alignment thruster firings were nominal, and a mechanism roll alignment
maneuver of about 1 degree was performed. Post contact thrusting was nominal
and full-firing duration occurred. Docking loads were nominal.
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The Orbiter docking system (ODS) avionics hardware performed nominally
throughout the docking sequence. The ODS was powered up at
015:03:19:25 G.m.t. (02:17:52:03 MET). Capture occurred nominally at
015:03:54:50 G.m.t. (02:18:27:28 MET). The capture latches were activated at
015:04:02:36 G.m.t. (02:18:35:14 MET), and the docking ring proceeded to the
"Final" position that ended the automated docking sequence with a successful
Orbiter/Mir docking, which was completed at 015:04:02:43 G.m.t.
(02:18:35:21 MET).
Vestibule pressurization occurred at 015:04:29 G.m.t. (02:19:01 MET), cabin
pressure equalization with Mir was begun at 015:05:32 G.m.t. (02:20:04 MET),
and hatch opening occurred at 015:05:57 G.m.t. (02:20:29 MET).
At approximately 015:14:42 G.m.t. (03:05:15 MET), excessive drift rates and
drift-rate trending were observed on the inertial measurement unit (IMU) 3
X- and Y-axes (Flight Problem STS-81-V-02). The performance signature was
similar to that seen previously, and the cause has been inadequate or
contaminated lubrication in the vertical (x-y axis) gyro. To preserve IMU 3 for
use during entry and landing, the crew switched the IMU to standby at
017:14:33 G.m.t. (05:05:05 MET). This action was expected to maintain the
X- and Y-axis gyro drift rate at about its pre-shutdown value. The IMU was
switched to operate on entry day at 022:06:21 G.m.t. (09:20:54 MET), and the
IMU performed satisfactorily throughout entry and landing.
The fuel cell 1 calculated performance (differential voltage) started degrading at
a faster-than-normal rate at 017:01:01 G.m.t. (04:15:33 MET) (Flight Problem
STS-81-V-03). The degradation rate shifted from a nominal value of
approximately 0.008 V/hr to a rate of 0.018 V/hr. As a result, the third on-orbit
purge was performed on all three fuel cells at 017:14:39 G.m.t. (05:05:11 MET).
Fuel cell 1 recovered some of its performance after this third purge, but it still
appeared to be lower-than-normal. Consequently, an additional (manual) purge
of only fuel cell 1 was performed at 017:14:52 G.m.t. (05:05:24 MET). This
additional purge did not appear to change the performance level of fuel cell 1.
As a precaution, main busses A and B were tied prior to the upcoming sleep
period.
A comparison of the fuel cell 1 voltage to the main bus A voltage indicated that
the fuel cell 1 voltage was reading 0.1 to 0.5 V low, which was determined to be
the cause of the erroneous calculated degradation rate. When main bus A
voltage was plotted against the fuel cell 1 predicted performance, the
performance appeared nominal. The fuel cell 1 voltage continued throughout the
flight to read lower than normal and the reading remained erratic. The main bus
A voltage and other parameters continued to verify that fuel cell 1 was healthy,
which indicated that the erratic fuel cell 1 voltage indication was an
instrumentation problem. Main busses A and B were untied at 019:01:58 G.m.t.
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(06:16:30 MET) after it was determined that the drop in fuel cell 1 performance
was due to instrumentation and not a problem with the fuel cell.
The STS-4 payload general support computer (PGSC) was used for both
Development Test Objective (DTO) 700-12 [Global Positioning System/Inertial
Navigation System (GPS/INS)] and RME 1318 (TVIS). The crew reported that
the STS-4 PGSC did not recognize the GPS/INS flash-card in the lower slot of
that machine (Flight Problem STS-81-F-03). Suspecting a problem with the
STS-4 PGSC, the crew checked for TVIS data that was recorded earlier in the
flight and did not find any data. The cause of these problems will require
postflight evaluation to determine if the PGSC was at fault. As a result of the
TVIS data not being found, RME 1318 was re-accomplished later in the flight,
and the data were recorded and downlinked to the ground controllers and
sponsor for evaluation.
During docked operations with the Mir, sixteen CWCs were filled and transferred.
The total water transfer was 1608 lb.
Orbiter/Mir hatch closure was completed at 019:12:46 G.m.t. (07:03:19 MET).
All activities and operations associated with the hatch closure were nominal.
The undocking, fly-around, and separation from the Mir were accomplished
nominally, beginning at approximately 020:02:13 G.m.t. (07:16:45 MET). The
ODS performed nominally during undocking operations. The ODS was powered
up at 020:01:46 G.m.t. (07:16:18 MET) and powered down at 020:02:24 G.m.t.
(07:16:56 MET).
A time executed command (TEC) was uplinked at 020:01:39 G.m.t.
(07:16:11 MET) (Flight Problem STS-81-V-05). The TEC failed to toggle the
Ku-band extravehicular activity (EVA) protect mode bit in the Ku-band/S-band
control word at its scheduled time of 020:02:20 G.m.t. (07:16:52 MET). The
command had been sent to disable the EVA protect mode. This problem
appears to be the result of an incomplete implementation Of Ku-band crew
member protection flight software change, which added a Ku-band EVA protect
mode capability to the flight software (FSW). Using this feature, the ground can
define a protected "area" for an EVA crewman (or for the Mir as was the case
during this mission) using Orbiter pitch and roll angles. If the Ku-Band antenna
points into this protected area while the mode is enabled, the FSW tums off the
Ku-band traveling wave tube (TWT), thus preventing the Ku-band antenna from
radiating while in the protected area. The command was subsequently sent not
using a TEC and the EVA protect mode was disabled.
The flight control system (FCS) checkout was performed using APU 3. The APU
and hydraulics subsystems performed nominally during the checkout. APU 3
was started at 21:05:34:39 G.mot. (08:20:07:17 MET) and ran for 3 minutes
54 seconds. The fuel consumption during this run was 14 lb. No water spray
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boiler operation occurred because of the short APU run time. FCS performance
was nominal.
Primary reaction control system (RCS) thruster F3F failed off at
21:06:28:28 G.m.t. (08:21:01:06 MET) on the first attempted firing during the
RCS hot-fire (Flight Problem STS-81-V-06). The maximum chamber pressure
achieved was 16.3 psia. The pressure signature, along with the fuel/oxidizer
injector temperature profile, was typical of an oxidizer-valve failing to open
completely because of iron-nitrate contamination. This was the sixth flight of this
thruster in the F3F position and the thruster had accumulated 10 pulses for a
total firing time of 5 seconds since being installed. The thruster was leak-free
and remained deselected for the remainder of the flight. All other thrusters
functioned nominally during the hot-fire.
The payload bay doors were closed at 022:09:01:41 G.m.t. (09:23:34:18 MET) in
preparation for landing. The first landing opportunity at the KSC Shuttle Landing
Facility (SLF) was waved off because of forecast and observed unacceptable
cloud cover. The dual-engine deorbit maneuver for the second landing
opportunity at the KSC SLF was performed on orbit 160 at 022:13:17:33.2 G.m.t.
(10:03:50:10.2 MET). The maneuver was 202.5 seconds in duration with a AV of
355.8 ft/sec.
Entry was completed satisfactorily, and main landing gear touchdown occurred
on concrete runway 33 at 022:14:22:46 G.m.t. (10:04:55:23 MET) on
January 22, 1997. The Orbiter drag chute was deployed at
022:14:22:46.3 G.m.t. and the nose gear touchdown occurred 9.7 seconds later.
The drag chute was jettisoned at 022:14:23:25.5 G.m.t. with wheels stop
occurring at 022:14:23:51 G.m.t. The rollout was normal in all respects. The
flight duration was 10 days 04 hours 55 minutes and 23 seconds. The APUs
were shut down 20 minutes 26 seconds after landing.
Approximately 14 minutes after wheels stop, the APU 3 gas generator chamber
pressure measurement shifted downward about 200 psi (Flight Problem
STS-81-V-07). The cause of this shift was determined to be a failure within the
transducer.
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PAYLOADS AND EXPERIMENTS
Valuable scientific data were returned from the Shuttle-Mir Science Program in
the areas of advanced technology, Earth sciences, fundamental biology, human
life sciences, microgravity and space sciences. These investigations provided
valuable information about space flight and long-term exposure to the micro-
gravity environment. In addition, the commercially initiated research and
technology evaluated new technologies and techniques using the Mir Space
Station as a test bed.
SPACEHAB SCIENCE AND SYSTEMS
The Spacehab systems operated flawlessly throughout the mission. Spacehab
tear-down was late on flight day 10 with closeout occurring prior to the deorbit
preparation activities.
A two-hour time period on flight day 9 provided a validation of the Spacehab
32 kbps data stream capability of the Spacehab. The use of this system is
planned for future flights.
Biorack
All eleven of the Biorack experiments were completed. The preliminary science-
gain assessment for the 11 experiments is:
a. FO-01
docking;
b. FO-02
c. FO-03
docking;
d. FO-04
crash/reboot;
e. FO-05
f. FO-06
g. FO-07
docking;
h.
i.
j.
k.
Fungus - 90 percent - Reduced time due to flight day 4
Cress - 80 percent - Reduced time due to flight day 4 docking;
Chara - <100 percent - Reduced time due to flight day 4
Dosimetry - > 90 percent - Meter 6 loss after PGSC
Biofilm - 100 percent
Isozyme - 100 percent
Osteogene - > 90 percent - Reduced time due to flight day 4
FO-08 Sperm - 100 percent
FO-09 Preplastid - >100 percent
FO-010 Aggs - 100 percent
FO-011 Gravity - >100 percent
Other problems reported with the Biorack involved a fixative leak in FO-02 Cress
operations. Leak cleanup procedures were reviewed by the Surgeon and
implemented by the crew without incident.
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The PGSC experienced six lock-ups during the course of the mission. The
symptom was a single-event upset resulting in a parity bit error. The suspected
cause was a combination of cosmic radiation and a PGSC memory intensive
application such as Biorack. Following the lock-ups, the data from the Meter 6,
Dosimetry Telescope (DOSTEL) investigation became static. Data recovery was
accomplished by reseating the data connector.• After the sixth lock-up, the Meter
6 data was switched to Incubator A position which was not connected to the
PGSC, and Meter 6 data were no longer downlinked but stored on internal
memory.
Commercial Generic Bioprocessin,q Apparatus
Two Commercial Generic Bioprocessing Apparatus (CGBA) units were
maintained in the powered configuration and placed in the Spacehab for return
to Earth, The units operated nominally.
Biotechnoloqy System
Two Biotechnology Systems (BTS) units were maintained in the powered state
when returned from the Mir to Earth. All operations continued to be nominal
during the return.
MIDDECK SCIENCE AND PAYLOADS
Surface Sampler Kit/Microbial Air Sampler
Air and surface samples were collected for this experiment. These were
returned to Earth for postflight analysis. The results of the analysis will be
published in separate documentation.
Cosmic Radiation Effects and Activation Monitor
The active monitor and passive foil detectors of the Cosmic Radiation Effects
and Activation Monitor (CREAM) experiment were initially deployed at the
nominally planned stations. The active monitor location was changed four times.
The final active monitor was located in the Shuttle airlock.
During deactivation, the crew reported that the green power light emitting diode
(LED) was off. Orbiter power problems were eliminated since other payloads
tied to the same power bus were operating nominally. Power cycling the unit
failed to light the LED. No data loss occurred because of the LED anomaly.
The CREAM recorded heavy ions that penetrate the structure as a function of
location, time, and orbital attitude. The results of this experiment will be used in
updating environmental models, understanding the effects on the human body,
and in the design of structures and electronics.
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RISK MITIGATION EXPERIMENTS
RME 1302 - Electric Fields High Inclination/Mir
The set-up and activation of this RME on the Mir was performed in accordance
with the scheduled time-line, and data collection lasted for approximately
15 hours. An alternate power cable was used to power the spectrum analyzer
when the cable that was called out in the procedures could not be located. Data
were also collected on the Orbiter during flight day 9, after which the RME was
deactivated and stowed.
RME 1303-1 - Enhanced Dynamics Load Sensor
The transfer of Enhanced Dynamics Load Sensor (EDLS) replacement hardware
was nominal. Photographs were taken of the EDLS foot restraints with an
astronaut in place to document placement and evaluate if the video angles will
be available to complete the Mir EDLS experiment.
RME 1303-2 - Mir Auxiliary Sensor Unit for Mir Structural Dynamics
Experiment
The Mir Auxiliary Sensor Unit for Mir Structural Dynamics Experiment (MISDE)
hardware was transferred to the Mir.
RME 1303-3 - Water Experiment Kit
Water Experiment Kit (WEK) 2 was transferred to the Mir, and WEK 1 was
returned from the Mir. WEK 2 will be used during the next phase of the Mir
mission and returned to Earth on a subsequent mission.
RME 1307 - Optical Properties Monitor
The Optical Properties Monitor (OPM) system hardware was successfully
transferred to the Mir Krystall module for storage until deployment during an EVA
later in the Mir operations. The OPM will be used to collect environmental data
from around the Mir.
RME 1317 - MISDE Joint Operations
The MISDE joint operations during the docked phase were successfully
performed. These operations included a Mir thruster firing, Mir treadmill crew
exercise, Orbiter RCS thruster firing, intravehicular crew push-off activities, and
day/night/day transitions. Negotiations prior to the Mir thruster firing test resulted
in a request to align the Kvant-2 module solar array parallel to the Kvant-2 long
axis. Also a request to repeat the Mir thruster firing test to capture Mir
accelerometer data was initially accepted, but the test was not performed
because of the Shuttle crew workload.
RME 1318- Treadmill Vibration Isolation and Stabilization System
The Treadmill Vibration Isolation and Stabilization System (TVIS) was
successfully completed and the required data were obtained. However, in
completing this RME, some problems were encountered and these are
discussed in the following paragraphs.
During the initial setup of the TVIS, it was noted that a mismatch existed
between the Orbiter power cables and the treadmill electronics box power input
connectors. Since the pin locations in a TVIS connector did not correspond to
the appropriate pin locations in the Orbiter power cable, the IFM procedure
provided instructions for the installation of jumper wires between the power cable
and the TVIS connector, as well as the direction for securing the jumpers and the
cable to prevent inadvertent disconnection. This IFM was completed and power
was provided to the TVIS.
A number of real-time operations were also completed to enhance system
operation and these included:
a. Adjustment of retaining pin on the RME frame for a more secure fit;
b. Relocation of a write-protect switch on the treadmill CCM cards to
allow data storage; and
c. Update of a TVIS configuration file default values to allow PGSC
PCMCIA card data storage.
The initial results indicate more oscillations than expected at walking speeds.
The recorded data included treadmill exercise data, TVIS force transmission
data, and TVIS camera target video motion data that was used for postflight
evaluation.
During an attempt to downlink the data recorded during the initial TVIS session, it
was discovered that no data were recorded on the PGSC PCMCIA card that was
used to store data. A further investigation concluded that the PGSC (STS 4)
used during the TVIS operation had malfunctioned. As a result, a plan was
developed and approved by the Mission Management Team (MMT) that the crew
would repeat the TVIS operations immediately after undocking and still maintain
the landing on the nominal timeline.
The TVIS hardware was subsequently unstowed and assembled for the second
TVIS operation on three test subjects. PGSC STS 5 recorded the data during
the second TVIS operation. Also, TVIS software changes were made to move
configuration files into the correct directory to avoid a problem encountered
during the first TVIS run. The TVIS operations were completed and the data
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were downlinked via the Orbiter Communications Adapter (OCA) and confirmed
as being good-quality data.
A noise that was believed to be a gyro causing the stabilizer springs to resonate
was determined to be of no impact to the test. The TVlS hardware
demonstrated a stable platform with a minor pitch oscillation associated with
fore-aft shifting of the runner on the running surface. Preliminary analysis of the
downlinked data show that a force of less than 1 Ib was imparted during the
steady-state walking/running. With the gyroscope not functioning, the TVlS
provided, as expected, a larger roll disturbance which had a magnitude that was
dependent on the running style and lateral displacement of the foot falls from the
treadmill center-line.
RME 1324 - Volatile Organic Analyzer
The Volatile Organic Analyzer (VOA) was powered at 12:14:45 G.m.t
(00:05:18 MET) and system bake-out proceeded as planned for the seven-hour
period. As the crew proceeded with the warm-up of the instrument, the VOA
display did illuminate. Power profiles during the bake-out indicated the system
was operating nominally until a current drop was observed. Power was removed
from the system, and discussions were held with the hardware developer that
confirmed that a suspected 3-ampere fuse had blown. The fuse was
inaccessible and also there was no spare onboard the vehicle. A decision was
made to declare the hardware failed and no attempt at further troubleshooting
was made.
The VOA is currently scheduled to fly on STS-84, as international Space Station
hardware, to test the Orbiter and Mir air quality.
RME 1325 - Water Quality Monitor
The total organic carbon (TOC) supply kit and analyzer were deployed in the
Spacehab. Control analysis of all standards to evaluate the performance of the
International Space Station prototype hardware was successfully completed.
The results were within the preflight predictions, thus demonstrating efficient
Water Quality Monitor operation. Additionally, three Mir water samples were
collected and will be analyzed during the postflight analysis operations.
CREW MEDICAL RESTRAINT SYSTEM
The crew medical restraint system (CMRS) was deployed and the first subject
was secured in 56 seconds using one medical officer. The deployment and
restraint required two minutes and this more than satisfied the requirement. The
crew reported no problems with the procedures and setup.
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SPACE STATION CREW MIDDECK INTERFACE FUNCTIONALITY
The Space Station Crew Middeck Interface Functionality (SSCIF) was connected
to the 1553 PGSCs for data collection during overnight periods while docked.
The data collected are being analyzed during postflight operations to determine
the extent of radiation upsets that occurred during operations.
KIDSAT PROJECT
The KidSat payload operations were very successful. The preflight plan was to
take 287 photographs with the Electronic Still Camera (ESC); however, excellent
coordination between all parties involved in the KidSat operations resulted in 525
photographs being taken. A total of 304 of the photographs were taken prior to
docking and 221 after docking.
Three error messages were received and these indicated no communication
between the ESC and the OCA. The first instance occurred early in the mission
when the AC utility power was off. The power was restored, but the images were
noisy. The second and third instances occurred about 4 hours later, when after
the second message the KidSat software was restarted and this caused the third
message. A checkout procedure was uplinked to the crew and after two
attempts of the procedure, success was achieved and the KidSat software was
restarted. The procedure required disconnection of the Global Positioning
System interface, rebooting of the OCA, and restarting the software. KidSat
reported 24 Mb of lost memory storage on the PCMCIA card, and this condition
may have been caused by the GPS interface. A backup PCMCIA card was
successfully used for the remainder of the mission.
MIDCOURSE SPACE EXPERIMENT
The Midcourse Space Experiment (MSX) was unable to acquire any data takes
as there were no conjunctions between the MSX and the Orbiter.
SPACE ACCELERATION MEASUREMENTS SYSTEM
The Space Acceleration Measurements Experiment (SAMS) hardware was a
part of the resupply hardware to the Mir. The hardware was transferred as
planned.
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VEHICLE PERFORMANCE
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
All Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) subsystems performed nominally and no in-flight
anomalies were identified. Analysis of the flight data and assessment of the
postflight condition of the recovered hardware indicate subsystem performance
was nominal.
The SRB prelaunch countdown was normal, and no SRB Launch Commit
Criteria (LCC) or Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specification
Document (OMRSD) violations occurred. For this flight, the high-pressure
heated ground purge in the SRB aft skirt was used to maintain the case/nozzle
joint temperatures within the required LCC limits.
Both SRBs were successfully separated from the External Tank (ET) at liftoff
plus 125.723 seconds. The right SRB main parachute no. 3 failed during entry
because of its entanglement of the canopy ribbons with the vent line. This
problem did not impact entry and water impact operations. The SRBs were
retrieved and towed back to shore, and returned to Kennedy Space Center
(KSC) for disassembly and refurbishment.
REUSABLE SOLID ROCKET MOTORS
The Reusable Solid Rocket Motors (RSRMs) performed satisfactorily, and all
parameters were well within the allowable performance envelopes and typical of
the performance observed on previous missions. There were no LCC violations
nor were any in-flight anomalies identified.
All RSRM temperatures were maintained within acceptable limits throughout the
countdown. The RSRM propellant mean bulk temperature (PMBT) was 63 °F at
liftoff.
Motor performance parameters were within contract end item (CEI) specification
limits. One out-of-family condition was noted on the pressure trace shape
variation during the 0- to 55-second time period, but the variation was well within
limits. The calculated PMBT was 63 °F at the time of launch. The maximum
trace shape variation of pressure versus time during the 62-80 second time
period was calculated to be 0.32 percent for the left motor and 1.45 percent for
the right motor. These values were well within the 3.2 percent allowable limits.
The RSRM propulsion parameters are shown in the following table.
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RSRM PROPULSION PERFORMANCE
Parameter
Impulse gates
1-20, 106 Ibf-sec
1-60, 106 Ibf-sec
I-AT, 106 Ibf-sec
Vacuum Isp, Ibf-sec/Ibm
Burn rate, in/sec @ 60 °F
at 625 psia
Burn rate, in/sec @ 63 °F
at 625 psia
Event times, seconds a
Ignition interval
Web time b
50 psia cue time
Action time b
Separation command
PMBT, °F
Maximum ignition rise rate,
psia]10 ms
Decay time, seconds
Left motor, 63 °F Right motor, 63 °F
Predicted Actual Predicted Actual
65.14
173.85
296.78
268.4
0.3687
64.35
173.53
296.55
268.2
0.3682
0.3695 0.3690
0.232
110.5
120.3
122.4
125.3
N/A
110.7
120.7
122.9
125.6
63 63
90.4 N/A
2.8 2.9
65.02
173.57
296.60
64.27
173.97
297.22
268.4 269.0
0.3685 0.3684
0.3693 0.3692
0.232
110.6
120.4
122.5
125.3
N/A
110.3
120.5
123.2
125.6
63 63
90.4 N/A
2.8 3.5
(59.4 psia to 85 K)
I
TaUoff Imbalance Impulse Predicted Actual
differential, Klbf-sec N/A 286.9
Impulse Imbalance = Integral of the absolute value of the left motor thrust minus
right motor thrust from web timeto action time.
aAII times are referenced to ignition command time except where noted by a b
b Referenced to liftoff time (ignition interval).
Field joint heaters operated for 12 hours 49 minutes during the launch
countdown. Power was applied to the heating elements an average of
31 percent of the time to maintain the field joints in their normal operating range.
Igniter joint heaters operated 17 hours 47 minutes during the countdown. Power
was applied to the heating elements 68 percent of the time to maintain the joints
within the normal operating range.
The aft skirt purge operated for a total of 27 hours 42 minutes. During the count-
down, the aft skirt purge was used to maintain the nozzle/case joint temperatures
above the minimum LCC temperature. During the LCC time frame, the
nozzle/case joint sensor temperatures ranged from 80 to 85 °F and 77 to 80 °F
for the left and right motors, respectively. The calculated flex bearing mean bulk
temperature was 79 °F.
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EXTERNAL TANK
All External Tank (ET) objectives and requirements associated with propellant
loading and flight operations were met, and no in-flight anomalies were identified.
All ET electrical equipment and instrumentation operated satisfactorily. The ET
purge and heater operations were monitored and all performed properly. No ET
LCC or OMRSD violations were identified.
No unexpected ice/frost formations were observed on the ET during the
countdown. Also, no ice or frost were observed on the acreage areas of the ET.
Normal quantities of ice or frost were present on the liquid oxygen (LO2) and
liquid hydrogen (LH2) feedlines, the pressurization line brackets, and along the
LH2 protuberance airload (PAL) ramps. All observations were acceptable per
NSTS 08303. In addition, the Ice/Frost Red Team reported that no anomalous
conditions existed.
The ET pressurization system functioned properly throughout engine start and
flight. The minimum LO2 ullage pressure experienced during the period of the
ullage pressure slump was 13.8 psid, which was well within the experience base.
The ET separation was performed satisfactorily, and the ET entry and breakup
were within 8 nmi. of the preflight predicted impact print.
SPACE SHU'I'rLE MAIN ENGINES
All Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) parameters were normal throughout the
prelaunch countdown and were typical of prelaunch parameters observed on
previous flights. Engine ready was achieved at the proper time; all LCC were
met; and engine start and thrust buildup were normal. No in-flight anomalies
were identified.
Flight data indicate that the SSME performance during mainstage, throttling,
shutdown, and propellant dump operations was normal. Cutoff times for SSMEs
1, 2, and 3 were 518.13, 518.25, and 518.37 seconds, respectively. The Ispwas
rated as 453.59 seconds based on trajectory data. Controller and software
performance were nominal.
The high pressure oxidizer turbopump (HPOTP) and high pressure fuel
turbopump (HPFTP) temperatures were well within specification throughout
engine operation. There were no failures, and no significant SSME problems
were identified.
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SHUTTLE RANGE SAFETY SYSTEM
The Shuttle Range Safety System (SRSS) closed-loop testing was completed as
scheduled during the countdown. All SRSS safe and arm (S&A) devices were
armed and system inhibits were turned off at the appropriate times. All SRSS
measurements indicated that the system operated as expected throughout the
launch countdown and flight.
As planned, the SRB S&A devices were safed, and the SRB system power was
turned off prior to SRB separation. The ET system has been deleted.
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE
Main Propulsion System
The overall performance of the main propulsion system (MPS) was nominal.
No LCC or OMRSD violations occurred, nor were any in-flight anomalies
identified.
All events and sequences were performed nominally. The aft hazardous gas
concentration during loading were nominal. Throughout the period of preflight
operations, no significant hazardous gas concentrations were detected. The
maximum hydrogen concentration level in the Orbiter aft compartment (occurred
shortly after start of fast-fill) was approximately 130 ppm, which compares
favorably with previous data for this vehicle.
LH2 propellant loading was performed as planned with no stop-flows or reverts.
A comparison of the calculated propellant loads at the end of replenish versus
the inventory (planned) loads resulted in a loading accuracy of -0.01 percent for
LH2 and +0.02 percent for LO2. The total LH2 load was 231,307 Ibm, and the
total LH2 load was 1,388,502 Ibm.
Data from the ascent phase indicate that the LO2 and LH2 pressurization and
feed systems performed as planned, and all net positive suction pressure
(NPSP) requirements were met throughout the flight. The minimum LO2 ullage
pressure experienced during the period of ullage-pressure slump was 13.8 psia.
The GOs fixed-orifice pressurization system performed as predicted.
Reconstructed data from the engine as well as MPS parameters matched the
actual ET ullage pressure measurements.
All three flow control valves (FCVs) performed nominally. The engine 1 FCV had
44 cycles, which was the most of any of the three systems.
Helium system performance for the SSME and pneumatic helium systems was
nominal. Entry helium usage was 59.6 Ibm, which is within the requirements. All
other parameters were also nominal.
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Reaction Control Subsystem
The reaction control subsystem (RCS) performed nominally with the exception of
primary RCS thruster F3F, which failed off (Flight Problem STS-81-V-06) during
the hot-fire test following the FCS checkout. This anomaly is discussed further in
a later paragraph.
A total of 4510.9 Ibm of propellants were consumed from the RCS tanks during
the mission. In addition, 2410.9 Ibm of propellants were consumed from the
OMS tanks during the mission.
The RCS maneuvers performed to rendezvous with the Mir are shown in the
following table.
RCS RENDEZVOUS MANEUVERS
Maneuver G.m.tJMET AV_ ft/sec ,
NC-3 013:11:37:23 G.m.t. 2.9
01:02:10:01 MET
NC-4 014:02:35:21 G.m.t. 3.3
01:17:07:59 MET
NH 015:00:16:12 G,m.t. 1.3
02:14:48:50 MET
MC-1 015:01:36:06 G.m.t. 0.7
02:16:08:44 MET
MC-2 015:02:06:16 G.m.t. 0.7
02:16:38:54 MET
MC-3 015:02:16:00 G.m.t. 0.2
02:16:48:38 MET
+X Separation 020:04:02:00 G.m,t. 3.0
07:18:34:38 MET
Primary RCS thruster F3F failed off at 021:06:28:28 G.m.t. (08:21:01:06 MET)
on the first attempted firing during the RCS hot-fire (Flight Problem
STS-81-V-06). The maximum chamber pressure achieved was 16.3 psia. The
pressure signature, along with the fuel/oxidizer injector-temperature profile, was
typical of an oxidizer-valve failing to open completely because of iron-nitrate
contamination. This was the sixth flight of this thruster in the F3F position and
the thruster had accumulated 10 pulses for a total firing time of 5 seconds since
being installed. The thruster was leak-free and remained deselected for the
remainder of the flight. All other thrusters functioned nominally during the hot-
fire. Thruster F3F as well as the other three thrusters (F3L, F3U, and F3D) on
the same manifold were removed and replaced during postflight turnaround
activities.
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During the NC-3 +X RCS maneuver that was performed at 013:11:37:23 G.m.t.
(01:02:10:00 MET) transients were observed in the thruster R3A chamber
pressure trace; however, these were attributed to operating in the left-OMS
interconnect configuration, and were not abnormal.
Orbital Maneuvering Subsvstem
The OMS performed nominally throughout the mission with no in-flight
anomalies identified. The OMS 1 maneuver was not performed because of the
nominal direct-ascent trajectory flown. The following table lists the pertinent
information conceming the OMS maneuvers.
OMS MANEUVERS
OMS firing
OMS 2
OMS 3
OMS 4
NC-2
OMS-5
Engine
Both
OMS-7
TI
Both
Right
Both
Ignition time, G.m.t./MET
012:10:10:23.3 G.m.t.
00:00:43:00.3 MET
012:13:03:03.3 G.m.t.
00:03:35:40.3 MET
013:01:02:27.8 G .m.t.
00:15:35:04.8 MET
Firing
duration,
seconds
I
47.6
51.4
10.0
_V, ft/sec
75
82
014:09:10:44.1 G.m.t.
01:23:43:21.1 MET
58.5
8.0
94
OMS-6 Both 014:23:41:15.6 G.m.t. 63.3 103
NC-6 02:14:13:52.6 MET
Left 12.0 9.5
25.6
202.6
015:01"13:54.1 G.m.t.
02:15:46:31.1 MET
020:13:53:53.2 G.m.t.
08:04:26:30.2 MET
42.7
355.8
Both
Both
OMS-8
Orbit
adjust
Deorbit 022:13:17:33.2 G.m.t.
10:03:50:10.2 MET
All prelaunch operations were nominal. Systems temperatures and pressures
were within expected ranges and system valves operated as commanded.
OMS propellant consumption during the mission was 20,204.7 Ibm of which
12,606.5 Ibm was oxidizer and 7598.2 Ibm was fuel. There were two periods of
interconnect operation (one left and one right), during which 2420.9 Ibm
(20.73 percent) of the OMS propellants were consumed by the RCS.
Evaluation of the inlet pressures, chamber pressures and regeneration jacket
temperatures for both orbital maneuvering engines (OMEs) showed nominal
performance. The OMS firing times and propellant consumption were consistent
with predictions, and this also verified proper operations.
Following the OMS 2, OMS 3 and OMS 4 maneuvers, the left-hand fuel-tank
total-quantity gauging system failed to indicate the forward total quantity level.
However, during the OMS 5 maneuver, the gauging system began indicating the
correct level after regaining the forward probe signal and remained active for the
remainder of the mission. This fuel-tank gauging system has exhibited similar
behavior on STS-71, STS-76, and STS-79. On STS-74, nominal performance
was not regained following the OMS 5 maneuver. An intermittent condition is
suspected in the system associated with the totalizer/forward probe.
Power Reactant Storage and Distribution Subsystem
The power reactant storage and distribution (PRSD) subsystem performance
was nominal throughout the STS-81 mission. The PRSD subsystem supplied
the fuel cells with 2671 Ibm of oxygen and 336 Ibm of hydrogen for the
production of 3862 kWh of electrical energy. In addition, the environmental
control and life support system (ECLSS) was supplied with 152 Ibm of oxygen,
which includes 57.7 Ibm furnished to the Mir Space Station. A three-day mission
extension was possible at the average power level with the reactants remaining
at landing.
The PRSD subsystem hydrogen (H2) manifold 1 isolation valve was opened and
gave a false indication at 017:01:11:48 G.m.t. (04:15:44:25 MET). The H2
manifold 1 isolation valve indication briefly showed open then indicated closed.
System parameters confirmed that the valve had in fact opened and remained
open. The valve indication had been proper the previous three days. The valve
had a similar false-closed indication on the previous flight of this vehicle, STS-79,
as well as on STS-74 and STS-71. Corrective action for the condition has been
deferred to the next OV-104 OMDP. When the H2 manifold 1 isolation valves
were opened at 019:23:54 G.m.t. (07:14:26 MET) the valve indicated open after
having falsely indicated closed for all but 2 hours of the previous three days.
Fuel Cell Powerplant Subsystem
Performance of the fuel cell powerplant (FCP) subsystem was satisfactory during
this fifth mission to the Mir. The average electrical power level and load was
15.8 kW and 518 amperes. The fuel cells produced 3,007 Ib of potable water
and 3,862 kWh of electrical energy from 2671 Ibm of oxygen and 336 Ibm of
hydrogen. Six satisfactory purges of the fuel cells were performed using both the
automatic and manual modes. The actual fuel cell voltages at the end of the
mission were 0.1 volt above predicted for fuel cell 1, and 0.2 volt above predicted
for fuel cells 2 and 3. The overall thermal performance of the fuel cell water
relief, water line and reactant purge systems was also nominal. Two in-flight
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anomalies occurred during the mission and these are discussed in following
paragraphs.
The fuel cell 1 calculated performance (differential voltage) started degrading at
a faster-than-normal rate after a PRSD cryogenic reconfiguration to PRSD tank 5
at 017:01:01 G.m.t. (04:15:33 MET) (Flight Problem STS-81-V-03). The
degradation rate shifted from a nominal value of approximately 0.008 volt/hr to a
rate of 0.018 volt/hr. At 17:07:22 G.m.t. (04:21:54 MET), the performance
shifted downward 0.14 volt when the PRSD tanks were reconfigured from tank
set 5 to tank set 4. Evaluation of the data indicated that the apparent
performance degradation was not related to the PRSD events. The third on-orbit
purge was performed on all three fuel cells at 017:14:40 G.m.t. (05:05:12 MET)
as it had been 48 hours since the last purge and the fuel cell 1 calculated
performance degradation was 0.28 volt, whereas fuel cells 2 and 3 had only
degraded 0.1 volt. Fuel cell 1 recovered some of its performance after this third
purge, but it still appeared to be lower-than-normal. Consequently, an additional
(manual) purge of only fuel cell 1 was performed at 017:14:52 G.m.t.
(05:05:24 MET). This additional purge did not appear to change the
performance level of fuel cell 1. As a precaution, main busses A and B were tied
prior to the upcoming sleep period.
A plot of the fuel cell 1 voltage and the main bus A voltage indicated that the fuel
cell 1 voltage shifted downward 0.1 to 0.5 volt at the same time that the
performance curve shifted. A plot of these two measurements showed that the
measurements were tracking each other until the shift. The main bus A voltage
and other parameters continued to verify that fuel cell 1 was healthy, and
supported the theory that the erratic fuel cell 1 voltage indication was the cause
of the indicated performance degradation and it was not a fuel cell problem.
Main busses A and B were untied at 019:01:58 G.m.t. (06:16:30 MET).
Postflight troubleshooting could not isolate the problem. Card 1 in the mid 1
dedicated signal conditioner (DSC) was removed and replaced.
All three channels of the fuel cell 2 cell performance monitor (CPM) remained at
the self-test value of 48-50 mV for 3.5 minutes for six consecutive self-test cycles
that began at 020:08:06:14 G.m.t. (07:12:38:51 MET), after which it operated
nominally for the remainder of the mission (Flight Problem STS-81-V-04). The
nominal self-test duration is 2 seconds every 7.5 minutes. Substack differential-
voltage values were nominal between self-test operations, indicating that fuel cell
performance was acceptable. This is the third consecutive flight that this fuel cell
(S/N 120) has experienced an anomaly with the CPM, the other two flights being
STS-73 and STS-75. Self-test operations returned to normal, and remained so
for the remainder of the flight. The CPM on fuel cell 2 was removed and
replaced during postflight turnaround activities.
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At approximately 020:13:57 G.m.t. (08:04:30 MET), the fuel cell 3 alternate water
line temperature increased to 122 °F. A review of the data revealed that the fuel
cell 1 and 2 alternate water line temperatures had small increases in temperature
at the same time that the fuel cell 3 alternate water line temperature began
increasing. The OMS maneuver performed at 020:13:53:53 G.m.t.
(08:04:26:31 MET) cracked all three alternate water line check valves and
apparently the fuel cell 3 check valve failed to reseat properly. The fuel cell 3
alternate water line temperature started to decrease 8 hours prior to landing,
from 120 to 100 °F over a 2-hour period. The temperature then increased to
124 °F. Two hours prior to landing, it again began decreasing and returned to a
nominal value of about 87 °F just prior to landing, which indicates the leak had
stopped. There was no mission impact and no postflight actions were
performed.
Auxiliary Power Unit Subsystem
The auxiliary power unit (APU) subsystem performance was nominal throughout
the STS-81 mission, except for the in-flight anomaly that occurred after landing
and that is discussed in a later paragraph. The run times and fuel consumption
for the APUs on this flight are summarized in the following table.
APU RUN TIMES AND FUEL CONSUMPTION
Flight
phase
APU 1
(a) (b)
Time,
min:sec
(S/N 407)
Fuel
consumption,
Ib
APU 3
(a)
Time,
min:sec
APU 2 (S/N 412)(a)
Time, Fuel
min:sec consumption,
Ib
20:21 50
90:35 162
110:56 212
(S/N 311 )
Fuel
consumption,
Ib
Ascent 20:16 49 20:25 52
FCS 03:55 11
checkout
Entry a 64:36 115 64:44 119
Total 84:52 164 89:04 182
a APUs were shut down 20 minutes 26 seconds after landing.
bAPU 3 was used for the FCS checkout.
The FCS checkout was performed using APU 3. The APU and hydraulics
subsystems performed nominally during the checkout. APU 3 was started at
21:05:34:44 G.m.t. (08:20:07:22 MET) and ran for 3 minutes 55 seconds. No
water spray boiler operation occurred because of the short APU run time. FCS
performance was nominal.
The APU 2 fuel pump/line/gas generator valve module (GGVM) system A
thermostat narrowed its set points after four cycles, resulting in the APU 2
bypass line temperature band decreasing from 40 °F to 5 °F. This thermostat is
located on a fuel line that is attached to the APU. Previous experience has
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shown that a thermostat located at this position will eventually fail once it begins
to indicate a narrowing of its set point range. Generally, this "narrowing" is a first
step followed by more erratic operation of the thermostat prior to failure. The
thermostat was replaced during the turnaround activity following the flight.
When the APU 2 gas generator (GG) bed heater was switched from system A to
system B, the GG injector temperature deadband decreased from approximately
85 °F to 12 °F. All APUs exhibit such change to a varying degree because of the
asymmetrical placement of the heaters relative to the injector thermocouple.
Although the APU 2 band is narrower than most APUs, it has been consistently
narrow on its six flights that began with STS-50.
Approximately 15 minutes after wheels stop, the APU 3 gas generator chamber
pressure measurement shifted downward about 200 psi (Flight Problem
STS-81-V-07). Data review indicated that the shift was most likely caused by a
bias shift in the chamber pressure transducer. This would make the fourth
transducer that has exhibited this performance in the past 18 months. This
transducer provides the best indication of proper APU performance and is,
thereby, mandatory for launch in the LCC. KSC ground testing of the transducer
and signal conditioner confirmed that the pressure transducer had shifted. The
APU has been removed and replaced.
Hydraulics/Water Spray Boiler Subsystems
Overall performance of the hydraulics/water spray boiler (WSB) subsystem
during STS-81 was nominal with no in-flight anomalies identified.
During ascent, the APU 3 lubrication oil temperature reached 272 °F before
WSB spray cooling began. During entry, the APU 3 lubrication oil temperature
reached 265 °F before spraying cooling began. The two APU 3 under-cooling
conditions did not violate the specification (no greater than 275 °F at spray start)
and had no affect mission operations. However, spray cooling should be
observed at approximately 255 °F. Ground checkout of WSB 3 was not
required.
Development Test Objective (DTO) 416 was performed following ascent. A
more complete discussion of this DTO was placed in the Development Test
Objective/Detailed Test Objective section of this report.
APU/hydraulic system 3 was used to perform the FCS checkout. The APU ran 3
minutes and 55 seconds, which was not long enough for WSB spray cooling to
begin as the lubrication oil temperature of APU 3 only reached 199 °F.
Hydraulic performance during entry was nominal. WSB 1 exhibited a 24.4 °F
over-cooling at the start of spray cooling. This condition, likewise, did not affect
entry flight operations. Ground checkout of WSB 1 was not required.
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rPostlanding, a regulator outlet pressure transducer dropout was observed on
WSB 3. Previous flights of this vehicle have exhibited similar behavior by this
transducer. Currently, no spare transducers are available; however, a new
design is being developed to replace the existing transducer. The next flight of
OV-104 will be flown as-is with this transducer.
Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystem
The electrical power distribution and control (EPDC) subsystem performed
nominally throughout the STS-81 mission. The data review revealed no
abnormal condition.
The heater indication problem with the ODS is discussed in detail in the
Structures and Mechanical Subsystem section of this report.
Pressure Control Subsystem
The pressure control subsystem (PCS) performed normally throughout the
duration of the STS-81 mission. Affer docking with the Mir, vestibule
pressurization occurred at 015:04:29 G.m.t. (02:19:01 MET) using Mir
consumables. Cabin pressure equalization with Mir was begun at
015:05:32 G.m.t. (02:20:04 MET) when the airlock upper-hatch equalization
valves were opened, and the Mir and Orbiter total pressure was equalized at
14.39 psia.
The hatch opening occurred at 015:05:57 G.m.t. (02:20:29 MET), and the entire
Mir/Orbiter volume pressure was raised to 14.62 psia using the Orbiter PCS.
The total consumables transferred to the Mir during the docked phase was
42.1 Ib of nitrogen and 57.7 Ib of oxygen. Prior to undocking, the pressure of the
combined vehicles was raised to 15.34 psia and the partial pressure of oxygen
was 3.98 psia.
Atmospheric Revitalization Subsystem
The atmospheric revitalization system (ARS) performed nominally during the
STS-81 mission. The maximum cabin environmental conditions during the on-
orbit phase showed an air temperature of 80.6 °F, a cabin humidity of
52.3 percent, and a partial pressure of carbon dioxide of 5.64 mmHg. All of
these conditions were acceptable and within limits.
An increase in inertial measurement unit (IMU) fan differential pressure above
4.5 inches of water occurred three times while the Orbiter was docked with the
Mir and the crew was sleeping. The differential pressure peaked at 4.68 and
4.73 inches of water during the first two occurrences of increased pressure. A
differential pressure of 4.96 inches of water was noted during the third period of
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increased differential pressure when the cabin pressure was 15.1 psia. The
normal operating limit is 4.95 inches of water and the closer that the fan operates
to that level, the shorter the life of the bearings. A review of the data from
previous docking missions also showed higher levels of fan differential pressure
while docked with the crew sleeping and the cabin pressure above nominal
levels. The avionics specification requires 144 Ib/hr air flow and with three IMUs
operating and the fan differential pressure at 4.95 or above, the cooling would be
marginal. Some increase in IMU temperatures would be noted. Only two IMUs
were operating during this period of elevated differential pressure. On future
docking missions, this higher level of differential pressure may occur when
docked and operating at elevated cabin pressure.
Active Thermal Control Subsystem
The active thermal control subsystem (ATCS) performed normally throughout the
mission. Supply water was managed through the use of the flash evaporator
system (FES).
SUDDIv and Waste Water Subsystem
The supply and waste water subsystem (SWWS) performed normally throughout
the mission.
Supply water was managed through the use of the FES, the water dump system,
and water transfer to the Mir Space Station. One nozzle dump of supply water
was performed at an average dump rate of 1.76 percent/minute (2.9 Ib/min).
The supply water dump line temperature was maintained between 64 and 96 °F
throughout the mission with the operation of the line heater.
Prior to undocking from the Mir, sixteen CWCs were filled and transferred. The
total water transfer was 1608 lb. Eight of the CWCs had only silver biocide
added and the remaining eight had both silver biocide and minerals added.
Waste water was gathered at approximately the predicted rate. Three waste
water dumps were performed at an average rate of 1.98 percent/minute
(3.26 Ib/min). The waste water dump line temperature was maintained between
55 and 76 °F throughout the mission. The vacuum vent line temperature was
between 57 and 77 °F, with the vacuum vent nozzle between 125 and 194 °F.
Waste Collection Subsystem
The waste collection subsystem (WCS) performed normally throughout the
mission.
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Airlock Support Subsystem
Use of the airlock depressurization valve was not required because there were
no planned or contingency EVAs performed. After docking with the Mir, the
external airlock-to-vestibule hatch equalization valve was used to equalize the
Mir and Space Shuttle habitable volume pressures. The active system
parameters indicated nominal outputs throughout the flight.
Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression Subsystem
The smoke detection system showed no indications of smoke generation during
the entire flight. Use of the fire suppression system was not required.
Flight Data Systems
The performance of the flight data systems was nominal throughout the mission.
Flight Software
The overall performance of the flight software (FSW) was satisfactory. One in-
flight anomaly was identified and is discussed in the following paragraph. This
anomaly did not impact the successful completion of the planned activities and
the flight.
A TEC was uplinked at 020:01:39 G.m.t. (07:16:11 MET). The TEC failed to
toggle the Ku-band extravehicular activity (EVA) protect mode bit in the
Ku-band/S-band control word at its scheduled time of 020:02:20 G.m.t.
(07:16:52 MET) (Flight Problem STS-81-V-05). The command had been sent to
disable the EVA protect mode. This problem was the result of an incomplete
implementation of the Ku-band crew member protection FSW change, which
added a Ku-band EVA protect mode capability to the FSW. Using this feature,
the ground can define a protected "area" for an EVA crewman (or for the Mir as
was the case during this mission) using Orbiter pitch and roll angles. If the
Ku-band antenna points into this protected area while the mode is enabled, the
FSW turns off the Ku-band traveling wave tube (TWT), thus preventing the
Ku-band antenna from radiating while in the protected area. The command was
subsequently sent not using a TEC and the EVA protect mode was disabled.
The reason for this incomplete implementation will be determined and a
corrective action will be implemented.
Flight Control Subsystem
The performance of the flight control subsystem was satisfactory. One in-flight
anomaly was identified and is discussed below. This anomaly did not impact the
successful completion of the flight. Also discussed in this section is the
performance of the flight control system during the joint phase of the flight.
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HThe performance of two of the three inertial measurement units (iMUs) was
satisfactory. However, IMU 3 (S/N 201) displayed anomalous performance and
a discussion of this occurrence is contained in the following paragraph.
At approximately 016:04:27 G.m.t. (03:19:00 MET), the IMU 3 developed
excessive drift rates and drift-rate trending in the X and Y axes (Flight Problem
STS-81-V-02). The performance signature was similar to that seen previously,
and the cause has been insufficient or contaminated lubrication in the vertical (x-
y axis) gyro. The problem was most recently seen on STS-75 and failure
analysis determined that the cause was insufficient lubrication of a vertical gyro
spin bearing. To preserve IMU 3 for use during entry and landing, the crew
switched the IMU to standby at 017:14:33 G.m.t. (05:05:05 MET). This action
maintained the X- and Y-axis gyro drift rate at about its pre-shutdown value. The
IMU was switched to operate on entry day at 022:06:21 G.m.t. (09:20:54 MET),
and the IMU performed satisfactorily throughout entry and landing. The IMU has
been removed and shipped to the vendor for failure analysis and repair.
On-orbit flight control system performance during the joint phase of flight was
nominal. No dynamic interaction stability concerns were observed. The Orbiter
controlled the mated stack using the vernier RCS thrusters during the entire
mated phase, except for three periods of Mir control. Mir control performance
was also nominal, with the exception of one period where the Mir failed to
completely enter a passive mode following resumption of control by the Orbiter.
During the mated phase, attitude quatemion data were periodically transferred to
the Russian counterparts to allow updating of the Mir inertial base.
On flight day 4, about 16 minutes after docking with the Mir, the Orbiter assumed
control of the mated stack, damped rates nominally, and maneuvered to the
desired Mir attitude. Nominal Orbiter flight control system performance was
observed.
On flight day 5, the Orbiter was moded to free drift, and the Mir assumed control
of the mated stack. Shuttle quaternion data had been used to provide a coarse
alignment of the Mir inertial base. At 016:07:36 G.m.t. (03:22:09 MET), the Mir
performed a precise alignment with its star tracker. These operations were all
performed nominally.
On flight day 6, the Mir Structural Dynamics Experiment (MISDE) (RME 1317)
was completed. At 017:05:06 G.m.t. (04:19:39 MET), the Mir assumed control of
the stack for 15 minutes to provide data from Mir control firings. At
017:06:40 G.m.t. (04:21:19 MET), a series of five open-loop vernier RCS thruster
firings were commanded to provide data from Orbiter control firings. Control
system performance from both of these tests was nominal, but it was later
learned that the Mir accelerometers had not been enabled during the Mir control
period.
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Consequently, on flight day 7, the Mir control portion of the MISDE test was
repeated. The Orbiter moded to free drift and the Mir assumed control of the
stack. The Mir immediately began an attitude maneuver indicating a divergence
from the planned attitude. The maneuver was terminated, the Mir was
commanded to the passive mode, and the Orbiter assumed attitude control.
Several hours after the Orbiter assumed control of the stack, it was observed
that the Orbiter yaw axis was remaining quiescent with attitude errors close to
zero degree for long periods of time. Discussions with the Russians revealed
that the gyrodynes were still controlling and had not been placed in the passive
mode. The Mir was again moded to passive and nominal Orbiter control
behavior resumed. No adverse impacts on the Orbiter or the Mir systems were
noted as a result of the late switching.
On flight day 9, the Orbiter undocked from the Mir, executed a fly-around
maneuver, and performed a separation maneuver. All Orbiter flight control
functions were performed nominally.
Displays and Controls
The crew reported that the lower right vertical lamp segment of the ones digit in
the minute field of the mission timer on panel O3 was burned out. The timer
continued to function; however, a slight degradation in readability was present.
The crew reported during debriefing that the failed lamp began to function later in
the mission. The problem was not observed during ground troubleshooting, and
the timer will not be replaced.
When the payload bay floodlights were turned on at 022:08:36:00 G.m.t.
(09:23:08:37 MET) for payload bay door closure, the forward port floodlight was
arcing and did not come up to full brightness. The crew confirmed that the
floodlight was not functioning and turned it off. The loss of this light did not
impact door-closure operations. The floodlight has been replaced.
Communications and Tracking Subsystems
All communications and tracking hardware and systems operated nominally
throughout the mission. One condition was noted that remotely affected the
communications system, and this condition involved a TEC that was uplinked at
020:01:39 G.m.t. (07:16:11 MET). The TEC failed to toggle the Ku-band
extravehicular activity (EVA) protect mode bit in the Ku-band/S-band control
word at its scheduled time of 020:02:20 G.m.t. (07:16:52 MET). The command
had been sent to disable the EVA protect mode in the Ku-band. Analysis of the
condition revealed a problem in the flight software that is discussed in the Flight
Software section of the report.
2?
After closing the ODS hatch on the day prior to undocking, the crew reinstalled
the ODS centerline closed circuit television (CCTV) camera and reported
difficulty receiving video from the camera. They reported at that time that they
had also experienced difficulty receiving video from the centerline camera when
it was installed prior to Mir docking (Flight Problem STS-81-V-08). In-flight
troubleshooting consisted of power cycles, verifying the camera installation and
switching to the backup centerline camera. The crew reseated the ODS-to-Mir
plug, power cycled the camera and centerline camera video was restored.
Troubleshooting for this condition will be performed.
Operational Instrumentation/Modular Auxiliary Data System
The operational instrumentation (OI) and modular auxiliary data system (MADS)
performed satisfactorily. No significant problems or in-flight anomalies were
noted.
The heater indication problem with the ODS is discussed in detail in the
Structures and Mechanical Subsystem section of this report.
Structures and Mechanical Subsystems
The structures and mechanical subsystems performed nominally throughout the
mission. Likewise, the tires and brakes were found in good condition for a
landing on the KSC concrete runway. The landing and braking data for the
mission are shown in the table on the following page.
The crew reported that that the aft-port latch on the lithium hydroxide (LiOH)
stowage door was difficult to open (Flight Problem STS-81-V-01). They were
unable to open the latch by hand and a tool was used. The plan was to leave
this latch open until entry day. A loads analysis was performed and it showed
that the LiOH door with the recumbent seat installed could withstand a 20g crash
load with the aft-port latch open. A troubleshooting procedure was developed
that used foil tape to obtain a mold impression of latch-pin-to-hole alignment. On
the day the Orbiter undocked from Mir, the crew reported that the trouble-
shooting procedure had been performed, and the pin got stuck mid-way to the
latched position. Further movement of the pin required such force that the crew
was unable to stop the movement before puncturing the foil. The crew reported
that there did not appear to be any problem with the pin alignment, but instead
the problem appeared to be binding of the latch mechanism.
The ODS performed nominally throughout the three phases of docking: docking
ring extension; docking, and undocking. The ODS was powered up for docking
at 015:03:19:25 G.m.t. (02:17:52:03 MET). Capture occurred nominally at
015:03:54:50 G.m.t. (02:18:27:28 MET). The electromagnetic brakes activated
5 seconds later and remained active for the nominal 30 seconds. Twenty-seven
seconds after the brakes were deactivated, the automated sequence began
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LANDING AND BRAKING PARAMETERS
From
Parameter threshold, Speed,
ft keas
Main gear 2945 194.4
touchdown
Nose gear 6377 143.6
touchdown
Brake initiation speed
Brake-on time
Rollout distance
Rollout time
Runway
Orbiter weight at landing
Brake sensor
location
Left-hand inboard 1
Left-hand inboard 3
Left-hand outboard 2
Left-hand outboard 4
Right-hand inboard 1
Right-hand inboard 3
Right-hand outboard 2
Right-hand outboard 4
Peak
pressure,
psia
6OO
613
468
576
576
669
624
576
Sink rate, ft/sec
1.0
Pitch rate,
deg/sec
N/A
N/A -5.6
73.6 knots
33.47 seconds
9,417 feet
67.1 seconds
33 (Concrete) KSC
214,915 Ib
G ross
energy,
million ft-lb
11.45
9.45
11.6
12.19
Brake assembly
Left-hand inboard
Left-hand outboard
Right-hand inboard
Right-hand outboard
driving the docking ring toward the forward position. The crew stopped the
automated sequence, thus allowing the relative motion between the two vehicle
to damp out. When damping was complete and since the docking ring was
aligned, the crew initiated a ring-in command, which began driving the docking
ring towards the final position. At 15:04:00:00 G.m.t. (02:18:32:38 MET), the
ball-screw linear advance reached 7 percent and the structural hooks were
activated and began driving to the closed position. The structural hooks were
closed and reached a linear advance of 92 percent at 015:04:02:09 G.m.t.
(02:18:35:07 MET). The docking ring was then extended, and the capture
latches were activated at 015:04:02:36 G.m.t. (02:18:35:14 MET) and were
deactivated two seconds later. The docking ring then proceeded to the "Final"
position and that ended the automated docking sequence with a successful
Orbiter/Mir docking, which was completed at 015:04:02:51 G.m.t.
(02:18:35:29 MET), after which the ODS was powered down.
The ODS was powered up for undocking from the Mir at 020:01:46:24 G.m.t.
(07:16:09:01 MET), and the structural hooks were activated in the open direction
at 020:02:13:03 G.m.t. (07:16:45:40 MET). The structural hooks traveled from
92 percent to 5 percent after which the hooks were deactivated at
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020:02:15:24 G.m.t. (07:16:48:01 MET), and the undocking was completed. The
ODS was powered down about 9 minutes later, having satisfactorily completed
its functions.
A known condition which involved the on/off toggling of the heater 2/DCU power
bus indication recurred when the ODS was powered for undocking. The
indication toggled on and off four times, throughout the undocking phase which
began at 020:02:08 G.m.t. (07:16:40 MET). This problem was discovered during
turnaround operations of STS-76. Troubleshooting during that flow confirmed
that the problem was with only the indication. The decision was made to fly-as-is
unless another problem would require replacement of an item in the heater
2/DCU power indication string.
The payload bay doors were closed at 022:09:01:41 G.m.t. (09:23:34:18 MET) in
preparation for landing.
Integrated Aerodynamic and Vehicle Heating and Thermal Interfaces
The ascent and entry aerodynamics and plume heating were nominal. The
prelaunch thermal interface purges were nominal. The SSME nozzles were
exposed to a higher level of entry aerodynamic heating than normal with the
metal being blue-colored. As a result, a metal hardness test was performed and
satisfactory results were obtained.
Thermal Control Subsystem
The thermal control subsystem (TCS) performed nominally throughout the
STS-81 mission, and all subsystem temperatures were maintained within
acceptable limits. A few instrumentation and minor heater problems occurred,
none of which impacted the mission.
A new system B heater thermostat for the OMS oxidizer high point bleed line
was installed prior to flight. This thermostat has a higher set-point range which
precluded a violation of the quick disconnect (QD) low-certification thermal limit
in certain docked attitudes.
Aerothermodynamics
Boundary layer transition was early (Mach 16 versus Mach 8) and asymmetric,
and this condition was caused by protruding gap filler at 20 percent of the
windward center-line. The acreage heating as well as the local heating was
above nominal as a result of the early boundary layer transition.
Thermal Protection Subsystem and Windows
The TPS performed satisfactorily. Based on lower-surface structural
¢
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temperature response data (temperature rise), entry heating was significantly
higher than expected. Boundary layer transition from laminar flow to turbulent
flow occurred earlier (Mach 16 versus Mach 8) than nominal. The transition
occurred approximately 950 and 1000 seconds after entry interface at the aft
most centerline measurements of the vehicle. There was also definite bondline
temperature data showing that asymmetric transition occurred on the right-hand
side of the vehicle, probably because of protruding gap filler at 20 percent of the
windward centerline. There was no reported physical evidence that would have
caused the asymmetric transition.
The postlanding inspection revealed a total of 100 impacts of which 15 had a
major dimension of 1-inch or larger. This total did not include the numerous
damage sites on the base heat shield that were attributed to the flame
arrestment sparkler system. A comparison of these numbers to statistics from
65 previous missions of similar configuration indicates both the total number of
damage sites as well as the number of damage sites having a major dimension
of one inch or larger were less than average. The distribution of the hits on the
Orbiter is shown in the following table.
TPS DAMAGE SITES
Orbiter Surfaces Hits > 1 Inch Total Hits
Lower Surface 14 48
Upper Surface 0 31
Right Side
Left Side
Right OMS Pod
0
0
7
7
3
Left OMS Pod 0 4
Total 15 100
The largest lower surface damage site was located on the right inboard elevon
and spanned two tiles. The damage site measured 8.0 inches long by
2.5 inches wide by 0.675 inch maximum depth. The depth of the damage site
indicates a probable impact of ice.
Tile damage sites aft of the LH2 ET/Orbiter umbilical were typical. The damage
was most likely caused by impacts from umbilical ice or shredded pieces of
umbilical purge barrier material that was flapping in the airstream.
No tile damage was noted that may have been caused by on-orbit debris or
miorometeorites.
The SSME 2 and SSME 3 dome-mounted heat shield (DMHS) closeout blankets
were in excellent condition. A torn/frayed area was noted at the
7:00-8:00 o'clock position on SSME 3, however. Tiles on the vertical stabilizer
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stinger were intact and undamaged with the exception of one small area near the
hinge of the drag parachute door.
No ice adhered to the payload bay door. No unusual tile damage sites were
noted on the leading edges of the vertical stabilizer and OMS pods.
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GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT/FLIGHT CREW EQUIPMENT
H
The Government furnished equipment (GFE)/flight crew equipment performed
satisfactorily. Anomalies were noted, but only one of these impacted the flight.
Immediately prior to the crew sleep period following flight day 1, the crew
reported that the video cable from CCTV monitor I to the TEAC recorder would
not mate to the recorder (Flight Problem STS-81-F-01). The cable connector
was not keyed for the locking pins on the recorder connector. An IFM procedure
was developed to work-around the connector problem. However, the crew
located another cable that was keyed properly for the recorder and used that
cable. As a result, the IFM procedure was not required nor performed.
The STS-4 PGSC wasused for both DTO 700-12 [Global Positioning
System/Inertial Navigation System (GPS/INS)] and RME 1318 (TVIS). The crew
reported that the STS-4 PGSC did not recognize the GPS/INS flash-card in the
lower slot of that machine (Flight Problem STS-81-F-03). Suspecting a problem
with the STS-4 PGSC, the crew checked for TVlS data that was recorded earlier
in the flight and did not find any data. The cause of these problems will require
postflight evaluation to determine if the PGSC was at fault. As a result of the
TVIS data not being found, RME 1318 was re-accomplished later in the flight
using the STS-5 PGSC, and the data were recorded and downlinked to the
ground controllers and sponsor for evaluation. This anomaly required the
rescheduling of the exercise operations, which impacted the flight, to obtain data
for the postflight evaluation.
The crew connected a camcorder to panel O19 using video interface unit (VlU)
serial number 1025 and attempted to route video of the flight deck from that
camcorder to a CCTV monitor. The VIU supplied power to the camcorder, but no
video was seen on the monitor (Flight Problem STS-81-F-04). A spare VlU was
installed and a good picture was obtained on the monitor.
During a private medical conference, two-way audio was not present via the
Proshare video-conference system (Flight Problem STS-81-V-02). Another air-
to-ground audio link was used in place of the link through the Proshare system.
Prior to the second medical conference, the crew verified that the configuration
of the link having the Proshare system was correct, but the audio was still not
functioning. The crew switched from the very lightweight headset (VLHS) and its
cable adapter to a portable speakers/ICOM recorder microphone and reported
that the audio functioned satisfactorily in the new configuration, which was used
for the remainder of the flight. Troubleshooting of the VLHS/cable adapter will
be performed post flight.
At 021:09:27 G.m.t. (09:00:00 MET), a smudge was noted on the center of the
camera A lens (Flight Problem STS-81-F-05). This condition will be evaluated
during postflight operations.
33
CARGO INTEGRATION
Integration hardware performance was nominal throughout the mission, and no
significant issues or in-flight anomalies were identified.
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DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES/DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY
OBJECTIVES
DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES
DTO 255 - Wraparound Digital Autopilot Flight Test Verification - The data
were collected from a series of maneuvers that were performed during entry and
the Terminal Area Energy Management (TAEM) phases of flight. The data have
been given to the sponsor for postflight evaluation. The results of the evaluation
will be published in separate documentation.
DTO 312 - External Tank Thermal Protection System Performance
(Method 4) - Photography of the STS-81 ET after separation was acquired with
a Nikon 35 mm camera using a 400 mm lens and a 2X extender_ The OMS 2
attitude maneuver was performed early to assist the crew in acquiring the ET
visually.
Twenty excellent quality views of the ET were acquired. The +Y/-Z axis of the
ET was imaged, and timing data were on the film. The first picture was taken
approximately 20 minutes after liftoff and the last was taken 64 seconds later.
Eight divots are clearly visible on or very near the LH2/intertank closeout flange.
Charring and multiple small 'popcom' divots are visible on the ET aft dome. The
normal SRB separation-motor burn scars and aerodynamic heating marks are
visible on the ET thermal protection system (TPS). Measurements from the film
show that the ET was 2.3 km from the Orbiter on the first ET picture. The ET
separation rate was calculated to be 4.2 meters per second, and this is typical of
separation rates from previous missions.
Film of the SRB separation from the umbilical well 16 rnm cameras (5 mm lens
and 10 mm lens) showed no anomalous conditions and a nominal separation.
The film of ET separation from the two 16 mm cameras and the 35 mm camera
was not usable as separation occurred in darkness and no imagery of the ET
was visible.
DTO 416 - Water Spray Boiler Quick Restart Capability - Data were collected
for this DTO after orbital insertion. This was the fourth of seven flights for this
DTO. The results of the data gathered for this DTO will help verify WSB support
of an orbit 2 deorbit or abort once around (AOA). The crew was to turn on the
WSB vent heaters when the corresponding APU lubrication oil temperature
reached 245 °F.
The opportunity was missed on system 1. The controller power was not tumed
on until after the lubrication oil temperature had dropped to 238 °F. The system
1 vent heater was activated approximately 11 minutes 35 seconds after APU
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shut down, and the vent temperature rose above 122 °F two hours and five
minutes later. System 2 was activated approximately 12 minutes 9 seconds after
APU shutdown, and the vent temperature rose above 122 °F one hour and
51 minutes later. System 3 was activated 11 minutes 36 seconds after APU shut
down and the vent temperature rose above 122 °F fifty-seven minutes later.
DTO 700-10 - Orbiter Space Vision Systems Flight Video Taping - A total of
20 video data takes were recorded for the Orbiter Space Vision Systems (OSVS)
DTO. These data were recorded during three crew-sleep periods and one crew-
awake period. The data takes included views from all four payload bay cameras
of target dots on the ODS, Docking Module, and Orbiter bulkheads.
This was the first flight of the targets being mounted on the Orbiter bulkheads,
one above each of the cameras. The purpose of the targets was to provide a
known reference in the camera field-of-view that allowed precise aiming of the
camera to be determined in support of the feasibility evaluation of Space Vision
System (SVS) as a rendezvous tool. Preliminary assessments of the real-time
downlinked video indicated that all targets were trackable by the Mission Control
Center (MCC) SVS unit. Postflight analysis of the video recorded onboard
during rendezvous and separation will provide data for determining the
performance of this aiming technique.
Downlinked video was also used to test SVS procedures and techniques that are
being investigated in support of station assembly tasks. One of the procedures
is the use of camera fields-of-view that are not one of the ten preflight calibrated
settings; this technique, if viable, will allow a more robust capability in the station
assembly task planning process. A second technique is the use of a single
target to precisely aim a camera, in lieu of the entire target array. It is hoped that
this technique will reduce target implementation requirements and provide a
reliable method of aiming cameras for SVS rendezvous applications.
DTO 700-12- Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation System- The
STS-81 flight represented the first flight of the DTO 700-12 Global Positioning
System/Inertial Navigation System (GPS/INS) in space. The GPS/INS
designated LN-100G and manufactured by Litton, was activated and
commanded into a gyrocompass alignment to coincide with the Orbiter IMU
alignment that occurred prior to launch. Automatic moding of the GPS/INS from
the gyrocompass alignment to the navigation mode at SRB ignition, based on
motion-sensor detection, performed as designed for the DTO. The PGSC locker
assembly and data acquisition system successfully demonstrated for the first
time the ability of experiments to record data during the high dynamics flight
phases of ascent and entry.'_,ln addition to ascent and entry, five on-orbit data
takes were successfully accomplished (flight days 1, 2, 6, 9, and 10) and these
generated over 60 hours of data.
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The reinitialization of the GPS/INS attitude using the Orbiter personal
computer (PC) decommutated-attitude data was first attempted on flight day 2,
and the GPS/INS was unable to receive its data. The GPS/INS was expecting
Packet 1 data, which contains Orbiter state-vector data needed by GPS/INS to
conduct GPS/INS attitude re-initialization. A change was made to the PC
Decommutation (PCDecom) configuration after the GPS/INS software was
designed, and PCDecom now provides the Orbiter state-vector data in Data
Packet 15 instead of Data Packet 1. Once this was discovered, a PCDecom
software configuration fix was uplinked, and another GPS/INS DTO attitude re-
initialization attempt was made. This and all future attempts failed, because the
GPS/INS PGSC was incorrectly configured to the PCDecom PGSC. This was
verified postflight via testing in the Shuttle Mission Simulator (SMS). As
documented preflight and during the flight, the RS-422 Y-cable should have
been connected so that the command PGSC (source) connector was mated to
the PCDecom PGSC communications (COM) Port 3. In the actual in-flight
configuration, the RS-422 Y-cable source connector was mated to PCDecom
PGSC Port 2. While attitude reinitialization was not demonstrated, the primary
goals of the DTO were met.
A considerable amount of data were collected on this first flight of GPS/INS in
low earth orbit. The INS-only performance during ascent was reasonable for
strap-down inertial devices. The GPS/INS filter performed well through main
engine cutoff (MECO) because of GPS measurement incorporation. However,
during the on-orbit phase, the GPS/INS filter performance had degraded by flight
day 2. Postflight tests of the flight GPS/INS by the vendor confirmed an
approximate 0.05 deg/hr (10 sigma) and 0.03 deg/hr (6 sigma) drift on the Y gyro
and Z gyro, respectively. The composite of the above drifts resulted in a 10 to
14 degree misalignment for the GPS/INS after 10 days, which contributed to the
observed entry anomaly. The reasons for the large Y and Z gyro drift were
that the GPS/INS filter was designed for the aircraft environment where a
vehicle's heading can be placed at specific orientations during ground
procedures to give the filter adequate data to calculate the gyro biases. Since
the goal of the DTO was to test the unit in the environment as close as possible
to Shuttle, the filter did not have any opportunities to accurately determine the Y
and Z gyro biases during ground testing. Based on the STS-81 flight, ground
calibration and alignment procedures have been developed to avoid similar
accumulation of drift in the Y and Z gyros for future DTO flights. The DTO also
determined that to avoid degraded on-orbit performance, the acceleration
thresholds on this particular GPS/INS needed to be higher to avoid incorporation
of noisy data into the filter.
These STS-81 GPS/INS lessons learned have already resulted in minor firmware
and procedure modifications to the GPS/INS (Honeywell H764-G) manifested on
STS-84. A final report of the STS-81 GPS/INS will be available April 1997.
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DTO 700-13A- Signal Attenuation Effects of ET During Ascent- Data were
obtained for this DTO, and these data have been given to the sponsor for
evaluation. The results of the analysis will be published in separate
documentation.
DTO 700-14 - Single String Global Positioning System - The DTO equipment
was set up and the PGSC was powered. The initial data review indicated that
the GPS receiver apparently became lost as a result of the NC2 rendezvous
maneuver. A partial reinitialization was performed that resulted in the receiver
tracking four satellites. The hardware operated nominally for the remainder of
the flight. Data collection was adjusted to coincide with the DTO 700-12 data
takes. This coincidental operation of these two receivers allows postflight data
comparisons to be made that will enhance the results of both DTOs. The DTO
was successfully completed with the power down and stowage of the PGSC, but
the receiver continued to operate and downlist data through entry, once the
backup flight system was activated.
DTO 805 - Crosswind Landing Performance - This DTO was assigned to the
flight as a DTO-of-opportunity. The conditions at landing did not support this
DTO; consequently no data were collected for the DTO.
DTO 840 - Hand-held LIDAR Procedure - The hand-held LIDAR (HHL)
operated nominally during the docking operations. The data have been given to
the sponsor for evaluation. The results of the analysis, which will determine the
usefulness of this procedure versus other proximity aids, will be published in
separate documentation.
DTO 1118 - Photographic and Video Survey of Mir Space Station -
Photography and video during the docking, onboard the Mir, as well as during
the undocking and flyaround of the Mir were successfully collected. The flight
day 8 undocking activities also included photography of the payload disconnect
assembly on the Docking Module hardware that has been exposed to the Mir
environment.
DTO 1125 - Measurement of Dose as a Function of Shielding Thickness -
Five spheres were successfully deployed on flight day 2 and stowed on flight day
10. The crew reported during the status checks that various spheres'
spectrometer screens were frozen. A reboot of the system cleared up the
failures and operations resumed. Postflight analysis will determine the amount
of data collected and the success of this DTO. The results will be published in
separate documentation.
DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES
DSO 487 - Immunological Assessment of Crew Members - Preflight and
postflight collection of the data for this DSO was performed. These data have
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been given to the sponsor for evaluation.
published in separate documentation.
The results of the evaluation will be
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PHOTOGRAPHY AND TELEVISION ANALYSI-_
LAUNCH PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS
A total of twelve 16 mm films, eight 35 mm films and twenty-four launch videos
were screened and analyzed. The usual events as well as the amount of debris
were noted, and no anomalous conditions were noted.
ON-ORBIT PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS
No on-orbit photography or video data were analyzed as no anomalous
conditions occurred that warranted this type of analysis.
LANDING PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS
A total of 11 videos of the landing were analyzed for significant events and
anomalous conditions. All events appeared to occur nominally and no
anomalous conditions were noted.
=,40
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TABLE I.- STS-81SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
Event Description Actual time, G.m.t.
APU Activation APU-3 GG chamber pressure 012:09:22:35.533
APU-1GG chamber pressure 012:09:22:36.637
APU-2GG chamber pressure 012:09:22:37.538
SRB HPU Activationa
Main Propulsion System
Start a
SRB Ignition Command
(Liffoff)
Throttle up to 104 Percent
Thrust a
Throttle down to
70 Percent Thrust a
Maximum Dynamic Pressure
(q)
Throttle up to 104 Percenta
Both RSRM's Chamber
Pressure at 50 psia
End RSRM a Action aTime
SRB Physical Separation a
SRB Separation Command
Throttle Down for
3g Accelerationa
3g Acceleration
Throttle Down to
68 Percent Thrusta
SSME Shutdowna
MECO
ET Separation
aMSFC supplied data
LH HPU System A start command
LH HPU System B start command
RH HPU System A start command
RH HPU System B start command
ME-2 Start command accepted
ME-1 Start command accepted
ME-3 Start command accepted
Calculated SRB ignitioncommand
ME-2 Command accepted
ME-1 Command accepted
ME-3 Command accepted
ME-2 Command accepted
ME-1 Command accepted
ME-3 Command accepted
Derived ascent dynamic pressure
ME-2 Command accepted
ME-1 Command accepted
ME-3 Command accepted
RH SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
LH SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
LH SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
RH SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
LH rate APU turbine speed - LOS
SRB separation command flag
ME-2 command accepted
ME-1 command accepted
ME-3 command accepted
012:09:26:55.104
012:09:26:55.264
012:09:26:55.424
012:09:26:55.584
012:09:27:16.442
012:09:27:16.529
012:09:27:16.664
012:09:27:22.984
012:09:27:27.209
012:09:27:27.224
012:09:27:27.243
012:09:27:54.090
012:09:27:54.104
012:09:27:54.123
012:09:28:16
012:09:28:23.690
012:09:28:23.705
012:09:28:23.724
012:09:29:23.394
012:09:29:23.434
012:09:29:26.104
012:09:29:26.384
012:09:29:28.704
012:09:29:29
012:09:34:51.537
012:09:34:51.552
012:09:34:51,573
Total load factor 012:09:34:53.4
ME-1 command accepted 012:09:35:48.513
ME-3 command accepted 012:09:35:48.534
ME-2 command accepted 012:09:35:48.539
ME-1 command accepted 012:09:35:54.793
ME-2 command accepted 012:09:35:54.814
ME-3 command accepted 012:09:35:54.819
MECO command flag
MECO confirm flag
ET separation command flag
012:09:35:55
012:09:35:56
012:09:36:14
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Event
APU Deactivation
OMS-1 Ignition
OMS-1 Cutoff
OMS-2 Ignition
OMS-2 Cutoff
Payload Bay Doors (PLBDs)
Open
OMS-3 Ignition
OMS-3 Cutoff
OMS-4 Ignition
OMS-4 Cutoff
OMS-5 Ignition
OMS-5 Cutoff
OMS-6 Ignition
OMS-6 Cutoff
OMS-7 Ignition
OMS-7 Cutoff
Initial Mir Physical Contact
Docking - Complete
Initiation of Undocking
Undocking - Complete
OMS-8 Ignition
OMS-8 Cutoff
Flight Control System
Checkout
APU-3 Start
APU-3 Stop
Payload Bay Doors Close
TABLE I.- STS-81 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
(Continued)
Description
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU 2 GG chamber pressure
APU 3 GG chamber pressure
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
PLBD rightopen 1
PLBD left open 1
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Docking ring contact
Docking ring final position
Actuation of hooks no. 1 drive
Undock complete
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Gas generator chamber pressure
Gas generator chamber pressure
PLBD left close 1
PLBD right close I
Actual time, G.m.t.
012:09:42:51.464
012:09:42:57.677
012:09:43:03.161
Not performed -
direct insertion
trajectory flown
012:10:10:23.3
012:10:10:23.4
012:10:11:10.8
012:10:11:10.9
012:11:05:35
012:11:06:53
N/A
013:01:02:27.8
N/A
013:01:02:38.0
013:13:03:03.4
013:13:03:03.4
013:13:03:55.1
013:13:03:55.2
014:09:10:44.1
014:09:10:44.2
014:09:11:42.5
014:09:11:42.6
014:23:41:15.6
014:23:41:15.7
014:23:42:18.8
014:23:42:18.9
015:01:13:54.1
N/A
015:01:14:06.1
N/A
015:03:54:50
015:04:02:43
020:02:13:04
020:02:15:24
020:13:53:53.2
020:13:53:53.3
020:13:54:18.5
020:13:54:18.6
021:05:34:39.149
021:05:38.33.510
022:08:58:21
022:09:00:42
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TABLE I.- STS-81 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
Event
APU Activation for Entry
Deorbit Burn Ignition
Deorbit Bum Cutoff
Entry Interface (400K feet)
Blackout end
Terminal Area Energy Mgmt.
Main Landing Gear
Contact
Main Landing Gear
Weight on Wheels
Drag Chute Deployment
Nose Landing Gear Contact
Nose Landing Gear
Weight On Wheels
Drag Chute Jettison
Wheel Stop
APU Deactivation
(Concluded)
Description
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Current orbital altitude above
Data locked (high sample rate)
Major mode change (305)
LH main landinggear tire pressure 1
RH main landing gear tire pressure 2
LH main landinggear weight on wheels
RH main landing gear weight on
wheels
Drag chute deploy 1 CP volts
NLG LH tire pressure I
Actual time, G.m.t.
022:13:12:32.856
022:13:38:26.763
022:13:38:27.660
022:13:17:33.2
022:13:17:33.3
022:13:20:55.7
022:13:20:55:8
022:13:51:12
No blackout
022:14:16:23
022:14:22:44
022:14:22:45
022:14:22:46
022:14:22:48
022:14:22:46.3
022:14:22:55
NLG weight on wheels I 022:14:22:56
022:14:23:25.5Drag chute jettison 1 CP Volts
Velocity with respect to runway
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
022:14:23:51
022:14:43.03.473
022:14:43:08.278
022:14:43:11.861
43
TABLE II.- STS-81 ORBITER IN-FLIGHT ANOMALY LIST
No.
STS-81-V-01
STS-81-V-02
Title
LiOH Stowage Door Latch
Difficult to Open
IMU X- and Y- axis Excessive
Drift
Reference
012:14:21 G.m.t.
00:04:53 MET
CAR 81RF02
PR STR-4-19-4416
015:14:42 G.m.t.
003:05:15 MET
CAR 81RF04
PR GNC-4-19-0140
Comments
The crew reported that the aft-port latch on the LiOH stowage door
was difficult to open. The latch could not be opened by hand and a
tool was used to open it. The plan was to leave the latch open until
entry day. A stress analysis was performed and it was determined
that the maximum load that the LiOH door could withstand with the
recumbent seat installed met the 20g crash load capability, even in
the event that the latch could not be closed for entry. Both the
STS-76 and STS-79 crews had trouble with this latch and work
was done prior to STS-79.
A procedure was developed that required the crew to inspect the
latch and use foil tape to make mold impressions of the pin-to-hole
alignment. The crew reported that when they performed the
procedure, the pin got stuck midway to the latch position. The
latch required such force to get it moving again that the crew was
unable to keep it from puncturing the foil tape. There did not
appear to be any problem with the pin fitting into the hole. The
crew stated that it felt as if the pin was bent, causing it to bind. No
problems were reported when the LiOH door was latched closed
for entry day.
KSC: Troubleshooting was performed and cycling of the latch
revealed no binding. Mold impressions were made to determine
the latch pin/latch hole alignment, the door was checked for
flatness, the fittings and latch were inspected, and no problems
were noted. KSC believes that the problem is the lateral tolerance
in the piano hinge. This tolerance allows the door to rack from left
to right approximately 0.010 inch. With the door racked full
starboard, the aft-port latch does not bind; however, with the door
racked fully to the port side, the aft-port latch binds hard, and the
conditions is repeatable. The aft port fitting was removed and sent
to the shop to machine approximately 0.020 inch from the hole.
The LiOH door was removed for access and will be checked for
flatness..
At approximately 015:14:42 G.m.t. ((03:05:15 MET), IMU 3
(SIN 3) began exhibiting increasing X- and Y-axis drift rates and
drift rate trending. The drift rates increased to the 8-10 _ (sigma)
range (1(_ is 0.006 deg/hr). The performance signature was
similar to that seen previously (most recently STS-75), where the
cause of the degradation has been determined to be inadequate or
contaminated lubrication in the vertical (x-y axis) gyroscope.
IMU 3 was taken to standby at 017:14:33 G.m.t.(05:05:l 5 MET) to
preserve it for use during entry and landing. IMUs 1 and 2
performed nominally t.hroughout the mission and IMU 3 was not
H'::
TABLE I1.- STS-81 ORBITER IN-FLIGHT ANOMALY LIST
ol
No.
STS-81 -V-02
(Continued)
STS-81-V-03
STS-81-V-04
Title
IMU 3 X- and Y-axis Excessive
Drift (Continued)
Reference
015:14:42 G.m.t.
Fuel Cell 1 Indicated
Performance Degradation
Fuel Cell 2 Cell Performance
Monitor Self-Test Duration Erratic
03:05:15 MET
CAR 1RF04
PR GNC-4-19-0140
(Continued)
017:01:01 G.m.t.
004:15:33 MET
CAR 81RF05
IPR 84V-0003
020:08:06 G.m.t.
007:22:39 MET
CAR 81RF07
PR FCP-4-19-0226
Comments
considered to be failed. IMU 3 was taken to operate at
022:06:21 G.m.t. (09:20:54 MET) and as expected, its
performance was similar to that seen prior to it being taken to
standby. The unit supported entry.
KSC: IMU 3 was removed on Jan. 29, 1997 and was returned
to the vendor for failure analysis. The one spare IMU that is
available is being held to supporta launch contingency.
The fuel cell I calculated performance (differential voltage) started
degrading at a faster-than-normal rate at 017:01:01 G.m.t.
(04:15:33 MET). The degradation rate shifted from a nominal rate
of approximately 0.008 V/hr to a rate of 0.018 V/hr. The third
on-orbit purge was performed on all three fuel cells at
017:14:39 G.m.t. (05:05:11 MET). Data indicate that fuel cell 1
recovered some of its performance after this third purge, but it still
appeared lower-than-normal. Consequently, an additional
(manual) purge of only fuel cell 1 was performed 13 minutes later.
The additional purge did not appear to change the performance
level of fuel cell 1. Since a fuel cell 1 problem could not be
immediately ruled out, a main A and B bus tie was performed prior
to the sleep period on flight day 6.
A comparison of the fuel cell I voltage and the main bus A voltage
indicated that the fuel cell 1 voltage was reading 0.1 to 0.5 V low,
which would lead to an erroneous calculated degradation rate.
When main bus A voltage was plotted against the fuel cell 1
predicted performance, the performance appeared normal.
Therefore, it is believed that the indicated performance
degradation was caused by an offset in the fuel cell 1 voltage
measurement. All other fuel cell I parameters indicated nominal
performance throughout the mission. The main A and B bus tie
was broken at 019:01:68 G.m.t. (06:16:30 MET).
KSC: Troubleshooting did not reveal anything abnormal. Card 1
in DSC mid number 1 was removed and replaced.
The fuel cell 2 (S/N 120) cell performance monitor (CPM)
experienced several self-test cycles that lasted up to 3.5 minutes,
whereas nominal self-test duration is about 2 seconds. CPM self-
tests occur every seven minutes. Substack differential voltage
values were nominal between self-test operations, indicating the
fuel cell performance was acceptable. CPM self-test operations
returned to normal after the anomalous cycles, and the condition
did not impact fuel cell operations.
KSC: The CPM was removed and replaced.
TABLE I1o-STS-81ORBITER IN-FLIGHT ANOMALY LIST
o_
No.
STS-81-V-05
STS-81-V-06
Title
TimeExecuteCommand(TEC)
FailedtoDisableKu-BandEVA
ProtectMode
Reference
020:02:20 G.m.t.
007:16:52 MET
CAR
PR DR 110320
Primary RCS Thruster F3F Fail
Off
021:06:28 G.m.t.
008:21:01 MET
PR FRC 4-19-0435
CAR 80RF08
Comments
A problem was encountered by the Instrumentation and
Communication Officer (INCO) when a time-executed command
(TEC) was uplinked at 020:01:39 G.m.t. (07:16:11 MET). The
TEC failed to toggle the Ku-band EVA protect mode bit in the
Ku-band/S-band control word at its scheduled time. This problem
appears to be the result of an incomplete implementation of
Ku-band crew member protection software (CR 90850C) on the
O1-25 version of the software.
The Ku-band crew member protection feature added a Ku-band
EVA protect mode capability to the flight software (FSW) Using
this feature, the ground can define the protection area (box) for an
EVA crewmember (or for the Mir) using Orbiter pitch and roll
angles. If the Ku-band antenna points into this box while the mode
is enabled, the FSW turns off the Ku-band traveling wave tube
(TWT), preventing the Ku-band antenna from radiating within the
protection box.
This mode can be enabled or disabled from the ground using the
Ku-band antenna control word. The ground has two ways of
commanding the Ku-band EVA protect mode capability; the
Ku-band/S-band antenna control uplink (uplink OP code 7), and
the TEC (uplink OP code 46). These two uplinks go through
separate paths in the FSW: Op code 7 implemented in the module
$UL, and OP code 46 implemented in module PMQ. The ability to
enable and disable the Ku-band EVA protect mode was added to
the OP code 7 uplink (SUL) but was apparently not added to the
OP code 46 uplink (PMQ). As a result, the capability to enable or
disable the Ku-band EVA protect mode in the TEC software
module PMQ resulted in a null operation. Although this was the
third flight of the OI-25 version of the software, it was the first time
that Ku-band EVA protect mode commanding was attempted as a
part of a TEC.
KSC: A software discrepancy report has been opened against
this condition.
During the reaction control sui_system (RCS) hot-fire test, primary
RCS thruster F3F failed off on its first attempted firing. Review of
the chamber pressure and injector temperature data from the
firing, as well as vehicle acceleration data, indicates that the failure
was most probably caused by iron nitrate contamination of the
thruster oxidizer valve. The thruster remained deselected for the
remainder of the mission.
KSC: The thruster F3F chamber pressure (Pc) tube was
inspected for blockage and none was found. Thruster F3F and the
TABLE II.- STS-81 ORBITER IN-FLIGHT ANOMALY LIST
4_
",4
No.
STS-81 -V-06
(Continued)
Title
Primary RCS Thruster F3F Failed
Off (Continued)
STS-81 -V-07
STS-81-V-08
APU 3 Chamber Pressure Shifted
Downward
Unable to View ODS Center-Line
Camera Video
Reference
021:06:28 G.m.t.
008:21:01 MET
PR FRC 4-19-0435
CAR 80RF08
(Continued)
022:14:37 G.m.t.
Postlanding
CAR 81RF06
IPR 84V-0008
019:14:12 G.m.t.
07:04:44 MET
Comments
other three thrusters on the manifold have been removed and
replaced. This action required removing the forward RCS module
and shipping it to the Hypergolics Maintenance Facility (HMF).
The forward RCS module has been reinstalled on the vehicle.
Approximately 15 minutes after wheels stop, the APU 3 gas
generator chamber pressure measurement shifted downward
approximately 200 psi in two steps. Data review indicate that the
shift was most probably caused by a bias shift in the chamber
pressure transducer. This would be the fourth transducer that has
exhibited this performance in the past 18 months. This transducer
provides the best indication of proper APU performance and is
mandatory for launch in the Launch Commit Criteria.
KSC: Troubleshooting has verified that the chamber pressure
transducer caused the shift. The APU has been removed and
replaced.
After hatch closing, the crew disconnected the Mir camcorder from
the ODS TV connector and configured for the ODS center-line
camera. The crew reported their attempts to view video from the
centerline camera were unsuccessful. The crew also confirmed
installation of the ODS-to-Mir plug connected to the CIP J101
connector. Downlink of the centerline camera video (VSU input
PI_2) did not provide interleaved data which indicated that either
the centerline camera (CTVC) was powered off, or video from the
camera was not reaching the VSU. The same condition was
evident with the backup centerline CTVC. The crew successfully
activated the prime centerline CTVC-to-middeck TV port M058F.
At 019:14:53 G.m.t. (07:05:25 MET), video from the centerline
camera was recovered. The crew reported no problems with the
truss camera indicating that at least part of the Mir-to-ODS plug
was always functioning correctly.
Questions were sent to the crew in an effort to better understand
the actions taken in restoring the video. Data evaluation and crew
responses to the questions has led the Engineering personnel to
believe that the camera was not receiving power, perhaps due to a
problem at the SSP (circuit breaker, switch, or wiring).
KSC: Postflight troubleshooting is being performed.
TABLE III.- GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT PROBLEM TRACKING LIST
oo
No.
STS-81-F-01
STS-81-F-02
Title
Monitor-to-VlU/CM Cable Failed to
Mate to TEAC
OCA Video Conferencing Audio
Problem
Time
012:15:04 G.m.t.
00:05:36 MET
013:12:42 G.m.t.
001:03:15 MET
Comments
Just prior to crew sleep following flight day 1, the crew reported
that the monitor-to-VIU/CM cable from CCTV monitor 1 to the
TEAC recorder would not mate to the recorder. The cable
connector was not keyed to accept the locking pins on the
TEAC recorder connector.
The two cables connected to CCTV monitors I and 2 for launch
were part no. SED 39122074-303, serial nos. 1008 and 5009.
The S/N 1008 cable had flown previously. This was the first
flight for the S/N 5009 cable. The 1000 series cables were built
by a previous contractor and the 5000 series were builtby
Boeing/Flight Equipment Processing Contractor (FEPC). The
cables were built to the same drawing and specification. A
comparison of the in-stock hardware revealed no differences
between the two series and the build paper showed that the
correct connectors were used on the cable on this flight. The
cable used for CElT should have been the same as the one
used for the flight. A third cable (S/N 5010) was located in a
camcorder bag.
The crew called down after wake-up on flight day 2 and stated
that the SIN 5009 cable had been replaced with a SIN 5010
cable from the camcorder camera bag. The two good cables
supported the mission very satisfactorily, and all applicable
mission objectives were accomplished. The cable was returned
to JSC for evaluation.
During a private medical conference (PMC) at 013:12:42 G.m.t.
(01:03:15 MET), two-way radio was not present via the
Proshare video conference system. The private air-to-ground
(A/G) link was used in place of the Proshare audio. The crew
performed a troubleshooting procedure prior to the second
PMC in which they verified that the configuration was correct,
but the audio was still not functioning. The crew switched the
very lightweight headset (VLHS) with portable speakers/ICOM
recorder microphone and reported that the audio functioned in
the new configuration.
The crew performed further troubleshooting on the VLHS by
switching the microphone and headphone inputs to verify that
TABLE II1.- GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT PROBLEM TRACKING LIST
No,
STS-81-F-02
STS-81 -F-03
STS-81 -F-04
STS-81 -F-05
,Title
OCA Video Conferencing Audio
Problem
STS-4 PGSC Problems
VlU SIN 1025 Failure
Smudge on Camera A Lens
Time
013:12:42 G.m.t.
001:03:15 MET
018:15:46 G.m.t.
06:06:19 MET
021:03:42 G.m.t.
08:18:15 MET
021:09:27 G.m.t.
09:00:00 MET
Comments
the cable jacks were not mislabeled. The audio did not function
in this configuration. The portable speakers/ICOM recorder
microphone were used in place of the VLHS for all future
Proshare video conferences.
The VLHS and its adapter cable were retumed to JSC for
troubleshooting.
The STS-4 PGSC was used for both DTO 700-12 (GPS/INS)
and RME 1318 (TVIS). The crew reported that the STS-4
PGSC would not recognize the GPS/INS flash-card in the lower
slot of that machine. Suspecting a problem with the STS-4
PGSC, the crew checked the TVIS PCMCIA card for data and
did not find any. It is unclear as to the cause of these problems.
However, as a result of these problems, the STS-4 PGSC is
suspect.
The PGSC was returned to JSC for evaluation.
The crew connected a camcorder to panel 019 using video
interface unit (VlU) S/N 1025 and attempted to route video of
the flight deck from that camcorder to the CCTV monitor. The
VIUs convert Orbiter 28 Vdc to 6 Vdc for the camcorder and
perform video signal balancing for interface to the Orbiter CCTV
system. The VIU supplied power to the camcorder, but no
video was seen on the monitor. The VIU was swapped with a
spare unit, and a good picture was obtained on the monitor.
The VIU was returned to JSC for troubleshooting.
Camera A had a smudge on the center of its lens. The
condition will be evaluated postflight.
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13. Crew Debriefing comments
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
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The following is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations and their definitions as these items
are used in this document.
AOA
APU
ARPCS
ARS
BTS
CCTV
CEI
CGBA
CMRS
CPCG
CPM
CREAM
CWC
DMHS
DOSTEL
DSO
DTO
AV
ECLSS
EDLS
EPDC
EOR/F
ESC
e.s.t.
ET
ETTF
EVA
FCE
FCP
FCS
FCV
FES
FSW
ft/sec
g
GCIL
GFE
GG
GGVM
GH2
G.m.t.
GPS
H2
HHL
abort once around
auxiliary power unit
atmospheric revitalization pressure control system
atmospheric revitalization system
Biotechnology System
closed-circuit television
contract end item
Commercial Generic Bioprocessing Apparatus
crew medical restraint system
Commercial Protein Crystal Growth experiment
cell performance monitor
Cosmic Radiation Effects and Activation Monitor
contingency water container
dome-mounted heat shield
Dosimetry Telescope
Detailed Supplementary Objective
Developmental Test Objective
differential velocity
Environmental Control and Life Support System
Enhanced Dynamics Load Sensor
electrical power distribution and control
enhanced Orbiter refrigerator/freezer
Electronic Still Camera
eastern standard time
External Tank
Extreme Temperature Translation Furnace
extravehicular activity
flight crew equipment
fuel cell powerplant
flight control system
flow control valve
flash evaporator system
flight software
feet per second
gravity
ground control interface logic
Government furnished equipment
gas generator
gas generator valve module
gaseous hydrogen
Greenwich mean time
Global Positioning System
hydrogen
Hand-held LIDAR
HPFTP
HPOTP
ICOM
IFM
IMU
INS
Isp
KSC
kW
kWh
Ib
Ibm
LCC
LED
LH2
LiOH
LMSMS&S
LO2
MADS
MC
MCC
MECO
MET
MISDE
mmHg
MMT
MPS
MSX
NASA
NC1- 6
NCC
nmi.
NPSP
NSTS
02
OCA
ODS
OI
OMDP
OME
OMRSD
OMS
OPM
OSVS
PAL
PC
PCS
PCT
PGSC
high pressure fuel turbopump
high pressure oxidizer turbopump
intercommunications
in-flight maintenance
inertial measurement unit
inertial navigation system
specific impulse
Kennedy Space Center
kilowatt
kilowatt/hour
pound
pound mass
Launch Commit Criteria
light emitting diode
liquid hydrogen
lithium hydroxide
Lockheed Martin Space Mission Systems and Services
liquid oxygen
modular auxiliary data system
midcourse correction (maneuvers)
Mission Control Center
main engine cutoff
mission elapsed time
Mir Structural Dynamics Experiment
millimeters Mercury
Mission Management Team
main propulsion system
Midcourse Space Experiment
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
rendezvous maneuvers (four)
corrective combination maneuver
nautical mile
net positive suction pressure
National Space Transportation System (i.e., Space Shuttle Program)
oxygen
Orbiter Communications Adapter
Orbiter docking system
operational instrumentation
Orbiter Maintenance Down Period
orbital maneuvering engine
Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specifications
Document
orbital maneuvering subsystem
Optical Properties Monitor
Orbiter Space Vision Systems
protuberance air load
personal computer
pressure control system
post contact thrust
payload general support computer
B-2 -
PMBT
ppm
PRSD
psi
psia
QD
RCS
RME
RSRM
S&A
SAMS
SLF
S/N
SRB
SRSS
SSCIF
SSME
STS
SVS
TAEM
TCS
TEC
TI
TIG
TOC
TPS
TVIS
TWT
V
WCS
Vdc
V/hr
VIU
VLHS
VOA
WCL
WEK
WSB
propellantmeanbulktemperature
partsper million
power reactant storage and distribution
pound per square inch
pound per square inch absolute
quick disconnect
reaction control subsystem
Risk Mitigation Experiment
Reusable Solid Rocket Motor
safe and arm
Space Acceleration Measurement System
Shuttle Landing Facility
serial number
Solid Rocket Booster
Shuttle range safety system
Space Station Middeck Interface Facility
Space Shuttle main engine
Space Transportation System
Space Vision System
terminal area energy management
thermal control subsystem/trajectory control sensor
time executed command
terminal phase initiation
time of ignition
total organic carbon
thermal protection system/subsystem
Treadmill Vibration Isolation and Stabilization System
traveling wave tube
Volt
waste collection system
volts direct current
volts per hour
video interface unit
very lightweight headset
Volatile Organic Analyzer
water coolant loop
Water Experiment Kit
water spray boiler
B_3 _i
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